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Abstract
Since the 2008 global nancial crisis, regulators have been paying considerable at-
tention to the credit and liquidity risks. Two such concepts (related to credit and
liquidity risks) that have been repeatedly mentioned in the regulatory announce-
ments are the credit value adjustment (CVA) and the Incremental Risk Charge
(IRC).
The CVA is an adjustment to the previous trade price when the counterparty
risk has been added. The IRC is a new type of risk charge dened in Basel II which
covers the major exposures of the counterparty and liquidity risk in the trading
book.
The current models on CVA and IRC have specic shortcomings. The CVA
is currently calculated on a one-period model with restriction on the number of
defaults. The IRC is computed using the time consuming Monte Carlo simulations.
In this dissertation, we have made signicant contributions to risk analysis by
solving CVA in both two-default and full model without the restriction on the
number of defaults as well as providing an analytical method for calculating IRC.
Our research can be considered as a major step forward in expanding the current
credit and liquidity risks models.
Compared to the current one-default CVA calculations, our two-default and
full calculations oer the distinct advantages of more accurate and practical CVA
results. On top of that, our PDE method provides the speed and accuracy which
ii
allows us to nish a thorough risk exposure analysis and identify the conditions
when the rst default CVA overestimates or underestimates the counterparty risk.
As opposed to the current numerical approach of calculating IRC, we oer an an-
alytical method which provides an approximation of VaR on the two-period model
and exact value of VaR on the innite-default model. This is the rst analytic so-
lution in the literature on the multi-period capital model and may impact the view
of current measure of risk controls in the banks. Thus credit risk control can be
greatly improved if this new analytic solution can be applied in nancial industry.
Combined together, the work in this dissertation makes signicant improve-
ments in credit risk analysis in the multi-period credit and liquidity risks models.
iii
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I Introduction
The 2008 global nancial crisis may be the worst nancial crisis in the past 70
years. It resulted in the plummet of stock markets around the world, the collapse
and subsequent bailout of large nancial institute by government, prolonged high
unemployment rate, and the subsequent European sovereign-debt crisis. Even to
this day, many economies have not fully recovered from the crisis.
The crisis was the result of the false assumption that the housing prices would
continue to rise. Before the crisis, thanks to poor regulations, home buyers with
even poor credit could easily apply for a mortgage and later renancing their mort-
gages. This process led to formation of a complicated loan system that exposed
banks to many defaults. As a result, banks decided to reduce their risk to default
by packing and selling these similar loans mortgages as Collateralized Debt Obliga-
tion (CDO) or Collateralized Loan Obligation (CLO). The CDOs or CLOs issues
several tranches according to the default risk level. A most common example of
tranches are senior, junior and equity tranches. Banks kept the most risky equity
tranche and sold investors the less risky junior and senior tranches. The market
ignored the large number of subprime mortgages that were included in the CDOs
and CLOs and underestimated the default risk of the junior and senior tranches.
In addition, banks charged investors higher spread for these over valued tranches
and earned a greater prot. When the housing prices kept rising, borrowers with
highest default risk could simply keep renancing to pay back their mortgage. The
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underlying default risks were neglected. Clearly, a proper risk control may forbid
the banks issuing this large amount of CDOs and CLOs. However, banks were re-
luctant to execute proper risk controls because of the considerable prot they have
made.
Despite the unhealthy practice of issuing subprime mortgages, the stability of
the market, due to the consistently increasing house prices, enabled the banks to
neglect the long term drawbacks of such mortgages. In reality, the major risk factor
of the sub-prime loans is the default of the borrowers.
When the housing bubble burst, the values of all securities related to the U.S.
real estate began to plunge. Even the highest classes of CDS with zero default pos-
sibility and AAA rating lost value due to thousands of defaults. Rapid loss of value
in a very wide range of securities combined with the inability of the risk models to
properly assess the risk factors spread crippling fear in the markets. Banks magni-
ed the counterparty risk in an eort to address the massive number of defaults and
signicantly reduced the amount of money they were lending. Consequently, mar-
kets went through a period of harsh illiquidity in the trading book which resulted
in tremendous losses for all the involved parties.
With the crisis growing, the counterparty risk emerged as a major threat to all
global nancial institutions leading to a global freeze of lending practices bringing
billions of dollars in losses. Finance researchers, economists and policy makers
began to investigate the cause of this crisis. That was the time when the importance
of credit and liquidity risk controls were realized by bankers and regulators.
As reported in the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report (2011) [18] lack
of nancial regulation and supervision was claimed as one of the most important
factors contributing to this crisis. Realizing the lack of nancial regulation and the
importance of counterparty credit risk, regulators established a list of procedures
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as a precaution aimed at eective prevention of such a crisis. As an immediate re-
sponse to the nancial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
announced a series of changes to the Basel II framework in April 2008. These en-
hancements, referred as Basel 2.5 or Basel II Enhanced included revisions to the
Basel II market risk framework and guidelines for computing capital for incremen-
tal risk in the trading book. In 2010, the BCBS announced Basel III to regulate
bank capital adequacy, stress testing and market liquidity risk. Basel III raised the
quality, consistency, and transparency of the capital base, emphasized the liquidity
risk, strengthened the risk coverage of the capital framework in which the Credit
Valuation Adjustment (CVA) risk was added. These announcements brought vari-
ous changes to the nancial markets all over the world and changed the bank credit
risk analysis system.
To full the new requirements set in Basel III, all banks faced pressures from
regulators to improve their credit risk management and implement new risk models
with specic requirements.
In Canada, the Oce of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI)
encouraged the banks to develop their own models to calculate Incremental Risk
Charge (IRC). These models needed to be fully vetted inside each bank and sent
to OSFI for approval. If the model of a bank was not approved by OSFI, the
bank would be charged a \standard" capital requirement. The \standard" capital
requirement is a xed capital charge set by OSFI. It is normally much higher than
the model-based capital charge. From the perspective of the banks, a higher capital
charge means less risky but also less protable investments. Banks have a strong
huge motive to develop their own capital models that meet the requirement of the
regulations.
Among all important changes of the regulations, the counterparty credit and
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liquidity risks in the trading books were frequently addressed. For credit risks,
CVA and IRC are the two most important concepts. In this dissertation, we will
discuss and analyze CVA, IRC and related issues..
CVA is dened as the change of price when counterparty risk is added. In
recent years, counterparty risks has started to play an increasingly important role
in evaluation of credit risks. When a counterparty defaults, a replacement contract
is established and there is a probability that the cost of the replacement contract is
signicantly higher than that of the original one. The dierence between these two
prices is called the credit value adjustment (CVA). In some of the earlier pricing
literature for credit swaps, counterparty and investor are considered to be default
free as in Due (1999) [14] and Hull, et al.(2000a) [28]. Counterparty default risk
is considered in some studies (as in Hull, et al.(2000b) [29]) while the volatility
of the credit spread is neglected (the hazard rate is assumed to be a constant).
In other studies, volatility of the credit spread is included but the interest rate
of the underlying is assumed to be a constant as in Brigo, et al. (2005) [8] and
Sorensen (1994) [38]. In more recent work Brigo, et al. (2008a) [6], Brigo, et al.
(2010) [7] and Brigo, et al. (2008b) [9], both stochastic interest rate and hazard
rate models are used. In Brigo, et al. (2008a) [6] and Brigo, et al. (2008b) [9], both
investor and counterparty defaults, or \bilateral counterparty risk", are included
in the models. However, possible correlation between credit spread volatility and
interest rate is not considered. In Assefa, et al.(2011) [1], Crepey (2012a) [12] and
Crepey (2012b) [13], applications of bilateral counterparty risk have been discussed
and analyzed.
In this dissertation, we considered the pricing problem of a new product which
is called credit contingent interest rate swap (CCIRS). Following recent literature,
we assumed that both hazard rate and interest rate are stochastic with a possible
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correlation. Our main objective is to investigate the eect of a possible second
default and subsequent defaults, which have been neglected in all the existing lit-
erature. The basic question we addressed was whether it is justied to ignore the
cost associated with one or more possible defaults of the replacement contract of
the original CCIRS under normal market conditions. To do so, we rst solved the
pricing problem of CCIRS without the possibility of a second default. We also nd
the price of a CVA by allowing a second default and then without the restriction on
the number of defaults, and compare the prices using reasonable parameter values
for the interest rate and hazard rate.
In the second part of this dissertation, we focus on calculation of the IRC.
In response to the nancial crisis, the Basel Committee introduced the concept
of unsecuritised credit product in trading book (see Basel (2013b) [3]). IRC is
measured as the one-year Value-at-Risk (VaR) of unsecuritised credit products in
trading book at 99.9 percentile condence level. Currently, most proposed IRC
models are based on a multi-factor multi-period Monte Carlo Simulation model
(MC) as in CreditMetrics (2011) [11], Finger (2011) [19], Wilkens, et al.(2013) [45]
and Yavin, et al.(2010) [46]. In the latest Basel proposal, IRC would be replaced
by Incremental Default Risk (IDR), in which a two-factor modeling framework is
suggested (as in Basel (2013a) [2]) and only default losses are considered.
In the model based IRC rules, a few new concepts in the credit risk measure-
ments are introduced by Basel. Among these new concepts, liquidity horizon and
constant level of risk over one-year capital horizon are particularly interesting. The
liquidity horizon concept allows the banks to model the dierences in the under-
lying liquidity of the trading book position. It represents the time required to sell
the position or to hedge all material risk covered by the IRC model in a stressed
market. Currently the standard VaR measure is dened as 99-percentile/10-day
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VaR, embedded with 10 day liquidity horizon assumption. As witnessed during the
nancial crisis, banks experienced signicant illiquidity in a wide range of credit
products held in the trading book.
Another important concept introduced in IRC is the constant level of risk over
one-year capital horizon, which allows the banks to model portfolio rebalance of
their trading positions in a manner that maintains the initial risk level. Based
on my practical observations as an analysist in the bank for four years, proper
portfolio re-balancing assumptions are important concepts that makes the IRC
model more risk-sensible and relevant to the actual trading portfolio behavior.
For more liquidity and highly rated positions, the portfolio rebalancing provides a
benet relative to assuming the same position throughout the capital horizon. On
the other hand, in order to hold the initial risk level, one would have to replace the
position that defaults within the one-year time horizon and the replaced positions
would then carry the same high default risk.
The credit risk capital model in Basel II is the internal rating-based approach
(IRB), which is based on Asymptotic Single Risk Factor (ASRF) model. It has been
the standard capital charge model for the banking book and is often required as a
benchmark by regulators for the trading book. The principle of ASRF model is to
model a large credit portfolio via a one risk factor model, which is straightforward
and analytically trackable. It assumes that the portfolio is innitely ne grained
driven by one systematic risk factor with the idiosyncratic risk fully diversied away.
Since ASRF was introduced, the pros and cons of the IRB approach have been the
topic of extensive research in Hibbeln (2010) [27] and Lutkebohmert (2009) [31].
From the credit portfolio management perspective, the major weakness of ASRF
model is its inability to capture the concentration risk. Credit concentrations, in-
cluding both name concentrations and sector concentrations, are probably the sin-
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gle most important cause of major credit problems, which are behind most of the
major banking disasters including the most recent nancial crisis as mentioned in
Basel (2000) [4] and Basel (2006) [5]. Within the IRB approach, the undiversi-
ed idiosyncratic risk can be approximated analytically via a granularity adjust-
ment(GA) approximation. GA was rst introduced in 2000 by Gordy (2003) [20].
The model was improved and re-established on a more rigorous foundation by Mar-
tin, et al.(2002) [32], Wilde (2001) [44], Giyrueriyx, et al.(2000) [26]. A survey of
these developments and a primer on the mathematical derivation is presented in
Gordy (2004) [21] and a rigorous proof of GA has been done recently by Fermanian
(2013) [17]. In recent years, the concept of GA has also been expanded in both the
application to model other risks (as in Gordy, et al. (2010) [22]) and credit portfolio
risk measures other than capital charges as in Dullmann, et al. (2006) [15], Pykhtin
(2004a) [34], Pykhtin (2004b) [35] and Voropaev (2011) [41].
The ASRF measure and its GA are almost fully developed and researched. How-
ever, the IRC calculation relies on the time consuming Monte Carlo simulations. So
the banks used more ecient ASRF (and its GA) as important measures for eec-
tive capital management for banks. In order to achieve a risk sensible comparison,
in this dissertation we present a general framework of two-period conditional VaR
model in the context of IRC modeling framework in which the liquidity horizon
and constant level of risk are considered. Given any time horizon, a two-period
adjustment term is derived on top of the standard ASRF model. At the end of
the rst period, the portfolio is rebalanced to ensure a constant level risk as mea-
sured by the credit rating. The analytical approach is then compared with IRC
MC models with and without portfolio rebalancing, ASRF with and without stan-
dard one-period GA to show how concentration risk, liquidity, and constant level
of risk are captured in the new analytical approach. From the IRC (and IDR)
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modeling perspective, the analytical model can be readily applied to case, in which
the portfolio rebalanced at six months with constant level of risk of the portfolio
being rating/exposure-at-default based. Then nally, we considered one important
question remaining about the multi-period VaR model, which is how to choose
a proper liquidity horizon. We presented an exact analytical VaR solution for the
innite-period model, which provides the boundary of VaR with respect to dierent
liquidity horizons.
By solving CVA calculation and analytical approach of VaR calculation by al-
lowing two defaults and without the restriction on the number of defaults, we have
made signicant and valuable progress in expanding the credit risk research to
dierent dimensions. While the existing research is still completing the current
framework of one-period model, our research not only opened a separate door for
the future research on CVA and IRC, but also provided guidelines for other poten-
tial multi-period credit risk research.
Rest of this thesis is arranged as follows. Chapter II studies the CVA model,
applies PDE in a specic CVA pricing problem and extends it to a two-default
case and then an no-restriction default case. We also have achieved a thorough
risk exposure analysis. Chapter III studies the basic capital requirement model,
extends it to a two-period model and solves it analytically by borrowing the logic
of GA technique. Then we present an exact analytical solution for innite-period
model. The Chapter IV concludes this dissertation.
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II A Multiple Defaults CVA Problem: Credit
Contingent Interest Rate Swap Pricing|What
Happens after the Default?
An interest-rate swap is a contract between two parties where one party (e.g. the
bank) receives a xed amount periodically in exchange for the LIBOR linked oat-
ing payments to the counterparty. When a counterparty defaults, a replacement
contract is established and there is a probability that the cost of the replacement
contract is signicantly higher than that of the original one. The dierence be-
tween these two prices is called the credit value adjustment (CVA). From the risk
management point of view, it is important for nancial institutions such as banks
to understand the risk of counterparty defaults and estimate CVA of their port-
folios. Currently, many banks operate under the assumption that CVA is the one
time replacement cost of an existing contract. Completely ignoring the fact that
the counterparty of the replacement contract could also default. Therefore, they
either overestimate or underestimate the true CVA. In this chapter, we systemati-
cally investigate the risk involved in the current practice. Using Credit Contingent
Interest Rate Swap (CCIRS) as an example, we present a detailed analysis of the
CVA and strong evidences that the risk involved by ignoring the possibility of sub-
sequent default of counterparties could be signicant, especially for relatively long
contracts with low credit ratings.
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Our results are useful for nancial institutions and nancial regulators as they
can serve as guidelines for estimating the true value of counterparty risk.
II.1 CVA and CCIRS
Its credit value adjustment (CVA) is the expected cost due to interest rate
changes as well as the replacement costs in the cases of defaults of both parties. In
Brigo, et al. (2008a) [6] and Brigo, et al. (2008b) [9], a general formula for pricing
CVA was introduced using the following notations:
I : default time of investor;
C : default time of counterparty;
U : default time of underlying:
T : maturity of the underlying;
A = fI  C  Tg; B = fI  T  Cg;
C = fC  I  Tg; D = fC  T  Ig;
E = fT  I  Cg; F = fT  C  Ig:
The price of a CVA under these notations is given as
EfD(t; T )jFtg = Ef(t; T )jFtg
+ EfLGDI  I(A [B)  P (t; I)  [ NPV(I)]+jFtg
  EfLGDC  I(C [D)  P (t; C)  [NPV(C)]+jFtg;
where Ef(t; T )jFtg is the price under the assumption that both the investor and
counterparty are default-free, and the second and third terms are the replacement
costs. Ft contains the full information before time t, LGD = (1 RecoverRate) is the
loss given default, NPV(t) is net present value of the residual payo for the investor
10
until maturity from time t, P (t1; t2) is the price at t1 of a zero coupon bond matured
at time t2, i.e. the discount rate from time t1 to t2. If only counterparty risk is
considered from the viewpoint of the bank (investor), the cost due to counterparty
default is
E

D(t; T )jFt
	
= E f(t; T )jFtg
  E LGDC  I(C < T )  P (t; C)  [NPV(C)]+jFt	 : (II.1.1)
Notice that the CVA is always non-negative when only the counterparty risk is
taken in to account. But if the bilateral counterparty risk exists, CVA also can be
negative. More importantly, the above formulas are correct only when the swap
expires at the defaults, or the counterparty of the replacement contract is default
free.
CCIRS is a contract which can cover the loss due to the counterparty default in
interest rate swap. Suppose the bank enters an interest-rate swap with a counter-
party so that the bank receives from the counterparty a xed amount periodically
in exchange for the LIBOR linked oating payment from the bank. If the counter-
party defaults, the bank needs to enter another swap agreement. However, the xed
rate will likely be dierent from the original one since the interest rate environment
and number of remaining payments have changed. Thus, the bank bears the risk
of making higher payment due to the possibility of default of the counterparty.
There is also the possibility that in case of a default, the new rate is lower, but this
scenario is of no concern to the bank from a risk management point of view. The
purchase of a CCIRS eliminates that risk, and the fair price of CCIRS should be
the expectation of the possible loss at the time when CCIRS is issued. Therefore,
the pricing problem of CCIRS is equivalent to that of a CVA problem for interest
rate swap when only counterparty risk is considered as in formula (II.1.1), under
the assumption that the replacement contract is default free. When the counter-
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party of the replacement contract is not default free, the pricing formulae (II.1.1)
underestimates the risk.
II.2 CCIRS with Default-Free Replacement Contracts
To price a CCIRS, we rst describe how an interest rate swap works and the
relationship between the xed and oating legs of the swap. A swap is a derivative
contract in nance in which two counterparties enter an agreement to exchange
certain benets of one party's nancial instrument another. The benets in ques-
tion depend on the type of nancial instruments involved. Specically, if the two
counter-parties agree to exchange one stream of interest rate payments against
another stream of payments, the derivative is an interest rate swap. If the two
counter-parties sign an interest rate swap contract, then one counterparty agrees
to make xed payments at specied times. Normally the payment is the product of
the notional value, the time interval between payments and the agreed xed rate
, i.e. Nol  t  Rxed. In return, it will receive a stream of payments based
on the oating rate. Similarly, the payment is normally the product of notional
value Nol, the time between payments t and the current oating rate Roating(t),
which is usually an indexed reference rate (such as LIBOR) with a xed spread Sp
(can be 0). i.e. Nol  t  (Roating(t) + Sp). For example, a company signs an
interest rate swap contract with a bank. The swap requires the company to pay a
xed rate at 5% in each payment time and the company receives a payment at the
LIBOR rate in return. The notional value is $1,000,000. The maturity of the swap
is ve years and payment is made semi-annually. Every half a year, company pays
1; 000; 000 0:5 5% = $25; 000 and receives 1; 000; 000 0:5LIBOR(t), where
t is the time when payment is made.
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II.2.1 CCIRS Pricing
In an interest rate swap, one party is required to make payments during each
t period, from t1 to tn. Let t be the current time, the (random) default time
for the counterparty is  , the next payment time is tk, the last payment time
is tn and T is the expiry time for the swap. If the default does not occur, the
present value of the remaining payments at time  is Nol  A (; T )K, where
A (; T ) = ti
Pn
i=k
P (; ti) is the remaining annuity after time  and P (; ti)
is the ti-maturity zero coupon bond price at time  . When the counterparty de-
faults at time  , the payment of the replacement contract is Nol  tR (; T ),
where R (; T ) is the new xed swap-rate calculated at time  . The present
value of the remaining payments (assuming no additional defaults) at time  is
Nol  A (; T )R (; T ). Normally a fraction of the present value Rec can be re-
covered at default. Therefore, only the portion 1   Rec needs to be covered by
CCIRS.
When the counterparty of the replacement contract is default-free, we can now
write down the cost of replacing the swap. For the counterparty paying the xed
rate, the possible loss when  < T is
v() = (1 Rec)(Nol  A (; T )R (; T ) Nol  A (; T )K)+
= Nol  (1 Rec)A (; T )(R (; T ) K)+;
while for the counterparty receiving the xed rate, the possible loss is
v() = (1 Rec)(Nol  A (; T )K  Nol  A (; T )R (; T ))+
= Nol  (1 Rec)A (; T )(K  R (; T ))+:
The derivative price at time t is simply the discounted expected value of v() at
time t under the risk-neutral measure, i.e., v(t) = E

I<T exp( 
R 
t
r(s)ds)v()jFt

.
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In our case, we only considered the price of CCIRS when the investor is paying the
xed rate. The price at default time  is
v() = Nol  (1 Rec)A (; T )(R (; T ) K)+: (II.2.1)
The derivative price at time t is
v(t) = Nol  (1 Rec)  E

I<T exp( 
Z 
t
r(s)ds)A (; T )(R (; T ) K)+
Ft :
(II.2.2)
Since both Nol and Rec are constants, we only need to compute the scaled price
E

I<T exp( 
Z 
t
r(s)ds)A (; T )(R (; T ) K)+
Ft : (II.2.3)
The nal price can be obtained by multiplying Nol  (1 Rec).
II.2.2 Model Selection
Since the default time  involves hazard rate process, a proper model of this
process needs to be chosen. On top of that, we need to choose a proper model for
interest rate as well. In our research, we assume the hazard rate process is the same
for all counter-parties with a same credit rating. Then we assume that both the
interest rate and hazard rate follow the mean reverting Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR)
model (introduced in Cox et al. (1985) [10]), a widely used model in industry. CIR
model is given by
dr = a1(b1   r(t))dt+ 1
p
r(t)dB1t (II.2.4)
d = a2(b2   (t))dt+ 2
p
(t)dB2t (II.2.5)
where d[B1t ; B
2
t ] = dt, i.e., the hazard and interest rates are correlated with coe-
cient . When 2a1b1 > 
2
1 and 2a2b2 > 
2
2, this model ensures the interest rate and
hazard rate are always positive and will never touch zero.
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II.2.3 Fixed Rate for an Interest Rate Swap
In this subsection, we derive the formula for the xed rate for an interest rate
swap Rt(t; T ), signed at time t, maturing at time T , with n payments at time
t1; t2; : : : ; tn. Suppose the time t for issuing the new swap is between tk 1 and tk,
which means the next payment time is tk.
For the xed leg, the present value of all the xed payment at time t is
Nol Rtt
nX
i=k
P (t; ti);
where Nol is the notional amount, Rt (short for Rt(t; T )) is the xed rate, P (t; ti)
is the zero-coupon bond price at time t and matures at time ti. For the oating leg,
one can use no-arbitrage argument to show that the present value of the payments
is equivalent to an investment in bonds that mature at ti (i = k; :::; n), which is
given by Nol  [1 P (t; tn)+Spt
Pn
i=k P (t; ti)], where Sp is the xed spread added
on oating index (i.e. LIBOR, etc), tn is the last payment date.
We can now compute the xed rate of swap by equating the value of the xed
leg and oating leg since the swap contract itself has no value at the time of signing
the contract.
Rt(t; T ) =
1  P (t; tn)
t
Pn
i=k P (t; ti)
+ Sp (II.2.6)
In fact t
Pn
i=k P (t; ti) = At(t; T ), At(t; T ) is the into-forward annuity from time
t to maturity T observed at time t. From (II.2.3), it can be seen that Sp can be
absorbed into the xed rate K in the valuation. Without loss of generality, we
assume Sp = 0 in rest of this dissertation.
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II.2.4 Discount Factor under Stochastic Short Rate
Denoting the discount factor from time t1 to time t2 is P (t1; t2), we expect
P (t1; t2) = E[exp( 
Z t2
t1
r(s)ds)jFt1 ];
where r(s) is short rate at time s and it follows:
dr = a1(b1   r(t))dt+ 1
p
r(t)dB1t :
Since exp(  R t1
r
r(s)ds)P (t1; t2) is a martingale, P (t1; t2) satises the partial dier-
ential equation (PDE)
@tP + a1(b1   r)@rP + 1
2
21r@rrP = rP (II.2.7)
with terminal condition P (t2; t2) = 1. This PDE is solved analytically as
P (t1; t2) = (t1; t2) exp( B(t1; t2)r(t)); (II.2.8)
where
(t1; t2) =

2 exp[1
2
(a1 + )(t2   t1)]
( + a1)fexp[(t2   t1)]  1g+ 2
 2a1b1
21
;
B(t1; t2) =
2fexp[(t2   t1)]  1g
( + a1)fexp[(t2   t1)]  1g+ 2
with  =
p
a21 + 2
2
1.
II.2.5 Solution Methodologies
II.2.5.1 Monte Carlo Method
To use the Monte-Carlo method (MC), we generate M realizations for r(t) and
(t) based on equations (II.2.4) and (II.2.5) . The default time  is generated using
16
the process of (t). We compute A (; T ) and R (; T ) using (II.2.6) and (II.2.8)
given in the previous sections. The value of a CCIRS is computed using equation
(II.2.1) at the default time  . In each realization where r(t) becomes a constant
process, we nd the discounted value of v() at the initial time (t = 0) with a
discount rate exp
   R 
t
r(s)ds

. This discounted value is the initial price of CCIRS
for each path. The expected CCIRS price is obtained by taking the average value
of all the M realizations of Monte Carlo simulated paths. When M is large, the
computational speed of Monte Carlo simulations decreases quickly which limits the
implementation of Monte Carlo simulations.
II.2.5.2 PDE Approach
Although Monte Carlo method is easy to implement, the PDE based approach
provides a more ecient alternative compared to time consuming Monte Carlo
simulations. In this subsection, we derive the partial dierential equations that are
needed for pricing a CCIRS.
Lemma II.2.1  is the rst jump time of a Poisson Process with parameter .
V (t) = E

exp( 
Z 
t
r(s)ds)f()
Ft
where Ft = Gt [ (It> ; 0  t  T ). Ft contains the full information before time t,
(It> ; 0  t  T ) contains the information that whether there has been a default
before time t. Gt contains the full information before time t except the information
contained in (It> ; 0  t  T ): Use Et[] to represent E[jGt] for short. Then we
have:
V (t) = It<Et
Z T
t
f(s)(s)exp( 
Z s
t
(r(u) + (u))du)ds

Proof See [30], Prop 3.1.
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The value of CCIRS at time t can be represented as
v(t) = E

I<T exp( 
Z 
t
r(s)ds)A (; T )(R (; T ) K)+
Ft :
Actually the PDE of v(t) is the direct result of Feynman-Kac theorem. We
decided to elaborate the proof here for the completeness of our thesis.
Theorem II.2.2
F (t) = v(t)exp( 
Z t
0
(r(u) + (u))du) +
Z t
0
f(s)(s)exp( 
Z s
0
(r(u) + (u))du)ds
is a martingale, where
f(t) = It<TAt(t; T )(Rt(t; T ) K)+:
Proof Use Lemma II.2.1, we have
v(t) = Et
Z T
t
f(s)(s)exp( 
Z s
t
(r(u) + (u))du)ds

; (II.2.9)
which gives
F (t) = v(t)exp( 
Z t
0
(r(u) + (u))du) +
Z t
0
f(s)(s)exp( 
Z s
0
(r(u) + (u))du)ds
= Et
Z T
0
f(s)(s)exp( 
Z s
0
(r(u) + (u))du)ds

:
Notice the last expression above is a martingale since the expectation does not
contain t. Denote the function inside the expectation as H. This means F (t) =
Et (H). Given the denition of a martingale, we only need to show
1. Et (jHj) <1;
2. Et [F (s)] = F (t); (s > t).
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The rst inequality is true evidently. Since
Et [F (s)] = Et [Es(H)] = Et (H) = F (t);
F (t) is a martingale.
Theorem II.2.3 The PDE satised by v(t; r; ) is
(@t + L)v + (f   v)  rv = 0 (II.2.10)
with terminal condition v(T; r; ) = 0, where
L = a1(b1   r)@r + 1
2
21r@rr + a2(b2   )@ +
1
2
22@ + 12
p
r@r;
f = At(t; T )(Rt(t; T ) K)+
Proof To simplify notation, we denote
D^(t) = exp( 
Z t
0
(r(u)+(u))du); M(t) =
Z t
0
f(s)(s)exp( 
Z s
0
(r(u)+(u))du)ds
and F (t) = v(t)D^(t) +M(t): Recall the models for r and 
dr = a1(b1   r(t))dt+ 1
p
r(t)dB1t ; d = a2(b2   (t))dt+ 2
p
(t)dB2t :
Applying Ito's lemma
dD^(t) =  D^(t)(r(t) + (t))dt; dM(t) = f(t)(t)D^(t)dt;
and
dv = vtdt+ vrdr + vd+
1
2
vrrdrdr + vrdrd+
1
2
vdd;
= vtdt+ vr(a1(b1   r)dt+ 1
p
rdB1t ) + v(a2(b2   )dt+ 2
p
dB2t )
+
1
2
vrr
2
1rdt+ 12
p
rvrdt+
1
2
v
2
2dt
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= (@t + L)vdt+ vr1
p
rdB1t + v2
p
dB2t :
This leads to
dF (t) = v(t)dD^(t) + D^(t)dv + dM(t)
=  v(t)D^(t)(r(t) + (t))dt
+ D^(t)

(@t + L)vdt+ vr1
p
rdB1t + v2
p
dB2t

+ f(t)(t)D^(t)dt
= D^(t) [(@t + L)v   v(r + ) + f] dt+ D^(t)vr1
p
rdB1t + D^(t)v2
p
dB2t :
From Theorem II.2.2, we know F (t) is a martingale. Therefore the coecient of
the dt term in dF (t) must vanish, which gives
(@t + L)v   v(r + ) + f = 0;
which can be rearranged to
(@t + L)v + (f   v)  rv = 0:
The remaining task is to nd the terminal and boundary condition for it. If the
counterparty defaults at or after the maturity T , there is no need to replace the
original swap. In this case, the price of CCIRS is zero. This gives us the terminal
condition as
v(T; ; r) = 0: (II.2.11)
For the boundary condition, we can look at the characteristic function of r
and . For r = 0, the dr
dt
= a1b1 > 0. And for this PDE, we have a terminal
condition which means we need to solve backward. And from the direction of the
characteristic function of r on r = 0, we can clearly see the value goes towards the
boundary line. For r = 1, the diusion term can be ignored because its order
20
is
p
r. So dr
dt
= a1(b1   r) < 0 , this means the value goes towards the boundary
line as well. The behavior of the value respect to  is the same. This means for
boundary condition, we can simply replace the derivative on the boundary with the
derivative of the inside point beside the boundary.
The PDE with the terminal and boundary conditions is solved using nite dif-
ference method, second order in time and alternating-direct-implicit in time.
II.2.6 Numerical Results
II.2.6.1 Parameter Values
In this section, we will do a rough estimation by using real data to calculate the
parameters of our CIR Model. This estimation is used here to give us a reasonable
sense about how these parameters should be picked up.
For interest rate, it is widely accepted that the risk-free rate curve is the best
approximation of short rate. And LIBOR rate curve is always used when a risk-free
curve is needed. Theoretically, if all LIBOR curves are risk-free, they should be
identical if compounded to an annual rate. In our paper, we can reasonably assume
the 12 Month LIBOR Rate is the best approximation of risk-free rate. So we used
the 5-year data of 12 Month LIBOR Rate starting from May 1st, 2009 to April 30,
2014.
Partial data of 12 Month LIBOR rate has been put in Table 1. We used the
rate 0.5490% on April 30, 2014 as the initial rate. The mean is used as the long
term average, i.e.,
b1 = mean(data) = 0:909%
and
mean(data) =
PN
i=1 ri
N
;
21
where N is number of data in ve years and ri is the 12 Month LIBOR in ith day.
And we know the conditional variance of the interest rate at any time t is
V ariance[rtjr0] = r0
2
1
a1
(e a1t   e 2a1t) + b1
2
1
2a1
(1  e a1t)2: (II.2.12)
For sucient large t, this variance will turn into a long term variance and r0 has
almost no eect. Then we let t = 100, and then we can reasonably assume the long
term variance equals to the variance of the 12 month LIBOR rate. Then we can
have
1 =
s
V ariance(data)
b1
2a1
(1  e 100a1)2
and
V ariance(data) =
PN
i=1(ri   r)2
N   1 ;
where r = 1
N
PN
i=1 ri: Assuming a1 = 1, we have 1 = 0:038060013. These estimated
parameters of b1; 1 and a1 have been put in Table 2.
For hazard rate, a commonly model applied in industry is the CDS spread
approach. This model assumes
(t) =
spread(t)
1 R ; (II.2.13)
where R is recovery rate and normally assumed to be 0.4.
We used the USD Financial sector 12 Month CDS spread data from May 1st,
2009 to April 30, 2014. Partial data of these CDS spreads has been put in Table
1 as well. Applying the model in (II.2.13), we used the rate on April 30, 2014 to
approximate the initial hazard rate. The mean is used to estimate the long term
average, i.e.
b2 =
mean(data)
1 R
and
mean(data) =
PN
i=1 spreadi
N
:
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And we have the same formula for conditional variance of the hazard rate at any
time t as (II.2.12),
V ariance[tj0] = 0
2
2
a2
(e a2t   e 2a2t) + b2
2
2
2a2
(1  e a2t)2: (II.2.14)
Since the relationship between the hazard rate and spread in (II.2.13) exists, it
is reasonable to assume the variance of spread equal to the variance of the hazard
rate. Then we have
2 =
s
V ariance(data)
b2
2a2
(1  e 100a2)2
and
V ariance(data) =
PN
i=1(spreadi   spread)2
N   1 ;
where spread = 1
N
PN
i=1 spreadi. Assume a2 = 1, we can then get 2. All these
parameters for dierent ratings are shown in Table 3.
The rating A is normally used as a testing grade. So we used the parameters
for rating A here, i.e., 0 = 0:64683%; b2 = 1:1736%; 2 = 0:035502957; a2 = 1:
The other parameters are set as follows, maturity T is set to be 5 years. The xed
rate K for original swap is 0.909%, =0.2 and the notional value is $250,000,000.
II.2.6.2 Monte-Carlo Results
In the Monte Carlo simulations, we set the number of realizationsM as 1,000,000
and divide the time to maturity (T ) into 2,000 equal parts. The computational time
is 648 seconds and the price is $2,204.58.
II.2.6.3 PDE Results
We use a 100100 grid for the interest rate and hazard rate and the number of
time steps is 600 over a 5 year period. The price for CCIRS is $2,236.22, which is
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close to the result got by the Monte Carlo simulation, within 1.9 seconds. When we
increase the number of time steps to 2000, the same numbers used in the Monte-
Carlo simulations, the total computational time increases to 3.62 seconds and the
price is $2,235.02, which suggests that the time step is suciently acceptable for the
spatial grid chosen. We have also obtained the result by assuming constant hazard
rate, which is obtained by solving the reduced PDE, with a 100 grid points in r
and 600 time steps over 5 years. The price for a constant hazard rate is $1,201.53,
quite dierent from the one with a stochastic hazard rate given in the table.
Table 4 shows the comparison of results obtained by using the PDE method
and Monte Carlo simulation. The dierences are small but PDE approach is much
faster.
In addition to the savings in computational time, the PDE approach also gener-
ates the price of CCIRS for the entire range of interest and hazard rates, as shown
by Figures 1. It can be seen that the price is in general an increasing function of
the interest and hazard rates, since higher hazard rates mean higher probability of
default.
II.3 CCIRS with Defaultable Replacement Contract
In the previous section, when the counterparty defaults and a new replacement
swap contract is signed, it was assumed that the counterparty of the new contract
is default-free. Therefore, the CCIRS price obtained in the previous section is only
an approximation, which may underestimate the real price. This is justied for
a counterparty with a high credit rating when the time to maturity is short. In
practice, however, the time to maturity of these contracts is relatively long (e.g.,
10 years). Therefore, it will be of practical interest to investigate the eect of the
default-free assumption, which is the focus of this section.
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II.3.1 PDE for the Second Default Problem
We assume that the replacement contract could also default but its replacement
is default free. In the rest of the thesis, this is called \two-default" problem, which
is a more accurate approximation of the time cost than the default free replacement
contract model, or the \one-default" problem discussed previously. The \second"
default problem is actually conditional on the happening of the rst default. Let
1 and 2 (2 > 1) be the default times of the original and replacement counter-
parties, respectively. They are the rst and the second jumps time of the Cox
process with hazard rate  given by (II.2.5). Recall that the price of CCIRS with
a default-free replacement contractor is given by (II.2.3) as
V (t) = Nol  (1 Rec)E

I<T exp( 
Z 1
t
r(s)ds)A1(1; T )(R1(1; T ) K)+
Ft :
We can rewrite this equation as:
V (t) = Nol  (1 Rec)E [D(t; 1)f(1)jFt] ; (II.3.1)
where
f(1) =
8<: A1(1; T )(R1(1; T ) K)+; 1 < T ;0; 1  T ,
and
D(t; 1) = exp

 
Z 1
t
r(s)ds

:
Again,Nol  (1  Rec) is a constant and we will drop it in the following discussion
knowing that the nal price can be obtained by multiplying our numerical solution
with it. When the counterparty of the replacement contractor is allowed to default,
there are three scenarios.
(i). Only one default occurs before maturity. Based on equation (II.2.1), the loss
at the rst default 1 is
v(1) = A1(1; T )(R1(1; T ) K)+
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(ii). Both defaults occur before maturity. The xed rate for a new swap at 2 is
R2(2; T ). The xed rate payment of the replacement swap between 1 and
2 is tR1(1; T ) and the xed rate payment of the second replacement swap
between 2 and T is tR2(2; T ). The discounted value of all the payments
between 1 and 2 is A1(1; 2)R1(1; T ). The discounted value of all the
payments between 2 and T is D(1; 2)NA2(2; T )R2(2; T ). The value of
CCIRS at time 1 is the sum
v(1) = A1(1; 2)(R1(1; T ) K)+ + A2(2; T )(R2(2; T ) K)+D(1; 2):
(iii). The rst default happens after maturity. There is no cost and the value of
CCIRS is zero.
Considering all cases above, the CCIRS price is given by
W (t) = E [D(t; 1)f(1; 2)jFt]
where
f(1; 2) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 2 > 1 > T ;
A1(1; T )(R1(1; T ) K)+ 2 > T > 1;
A1(1; 2)(R1(1; T ) K)+
+A2(2; T )(R2(2; T ) K)+D(1; 2) T > 2 > 1.
To simplify notation, let
eA(t1; t2) =
8>>><>>>:
At1(t1; t2) T > t2 > t1;
At1(t1; T ) t2 > T > t1;
0 otherwise.
(II.3.2)
We rewrite f(1; 2) as
eA(1; 2)(R1(1; T ) K)+ + eA(2; T )(R2(2; T ) K)+D(1; 2)
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and W (t) can be written as
W (t) = E
n
D(t; 1)[ eA(1; 2)(R1(1; T ) K)+
+ eA(2; T )(R2(2; T ) K)+D(1; 2)]Fto: (II.3.3)
To derive the PDE for W (t), we need the following theorems and corollaries.
Corollary II.3.1 For any T > 0 and  > t, let Zt be a Gt-adapted stochastic
process and Zt 6 0 when t  T , then:
E [D(t; )Z jFt] = Et
Z +1
t
ZssD^(t; s)ds

:
Proof Denote ti = it, i = 0; 1; :::, we have Z
(i)
s = ZsItis<ti+1 and Zs =
P1
i=0 Z
(i)
s .
It follows that
E [D(t; )Z jFt] = E
"
D(t; )
1X
i=0
Z(i)
Ft
#
(Since D(t; )Z(i) > 0; by Tonelli
0s Theorem)
=
1X
i=0
E

D(t; )Z(i)
Ft :
Since each Z
(i)
 = 0 when   ti+1, Theorem II.2.2 applies and
1X
i=0
E

D(t; )Z(i)
Ft = 1X
i=0
ItEt
Z ti+1
t
Z(i)s sD^(t; s)ds

=
1X
i=0
ItEt
Z ti+1
t
ZsI(ti  s < ti+1)sD^(t; s)ds

= It
1X
i=1
Et
Z ti+1
ti
ZssD^(t; s)ds

(Since
Z ti+1
ti
ZssD^(t; s)ds > 0; by Tonelli
0s Theorem)
= ItEt
" 1X
i=1
Z ti+1
ti
ZssD^(t; s)ds
#
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= ItEt
Z +1
t
ZssD^(t; s)ds

: (II.3.4)
This ends the proof.
Corollary II.3.2 From Corollary II.3.1, let rt  0 and Z(t)  1, for any  > t
we have
1 = Et
Z +1
t
sexp

 
Z s
t
udu

ds

:
Theorem II.3.3 (This is a stronger result than Corollary II.3.2.)Z 1
t
sexp

 
Z s
t
udu

ds = 1:
Proof From the proof of Proposition 3.1 in [30], the density of the default time for
s > t is given by
@
@s
P(  sj > t;GT ) = sexp

 
Z s
t
udu

:
We know the integration of density function is 1, which proves Theorem II.3.3.
Theorem II.3.4
Au(u; s) = Au(u; T )  E[D(u; s)As(s; T )jFu]:
Proof First, we have
Au(u; T )  Au(u; s) = t
nX
i=ku
P (u; ti) t
jsX
i=ku
P (u; ti);= t
nX
i=js+1
P (u; ti):
where ku is the next payment time after time u, and js is the closest payment time
which is before or equal to s.
Since
P (u; ti) = E[D(u; s)D(s; ti)jFu];
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we have
t
nX
i=js+1
P (u; ti) = E
"
t
nX
i=js+1
D(u; s)D(s; ti)
Fu
#
= E
"
D(u; s)tEs
"
nX
i=js+1
D(s; ti)
#Fu
#
= E
"
D(u; s)t
nX
i=js+1
P (s; ti)
Fu
#
= E [D(u; s)As(s; T )jFu] :
Corollary II.3.5
eA(u; s) = eA(u; T )  E[D(u; s) eA(s; T )jFu] (s > u):
Proof For s > T , the left-hand-side equals to eA(u; T ), and the right-hand-side
equals to eA(u; T )   0. Therefore the Corollary is true. For u > T , both sides of
the equation equal to zero. Finally, for s < T , the left-hand-side equals to A(u; s)
and the right-hand-side equals to Au(u; T ) E[D(u; s)As(s; T )jFu]. Applying The-
orem II.3.4 proves the Corollary.
With these preparations, we are now in the position to derive the PDE forW (t).
We note that
W (t) = E
n
D(t; 1)[ eA(1; 2)(R1(1; T ) K)+
+ eA(2; T )(R2(2; T ) K)+D(1; 2)]Fto
= E
n
D(t; 1)E
 eA(1; 2)(R1(1; T ) K)+
+ eA(2; T )(R2(2; T ) K)+D(1; 2)F1Fto
= E
n
D(t; 1)E
 eA(1; 2)(R1(1; T ) K)+F1Fto
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+ E
n
D(t; 1)E
 eA(2; T )(R2(2; T ) K)+D(1; 2)F1Fto;
which can be separated into two parts as
WA(t) = E
n
D(t; 1)E
 eA(1; 2)(R1(1; T ) K)+F1Fto; (II.3.5)
and
WB(t) = E
n
D(t; 1)E
 eA(2; T )(R2(2; T ) K)+D(1; 2)F1Fto: (II.3.6)
II.3.1.1 PDE for WA(t)
From the denition of eA(t1; t2) in (II.3.2), when 2 > T , eA(1; 2) = A1(1; T ) 6
0. Using Corollary II.3.1 yields
E
 eA(1; 2)F1 = I2>1E1 Z 1
1
eA(1; s)(s)D^(1; s)ds
= E1
Z 1
1
eA(1; s)(s)D^(1; s)ds
since 2 > 1. Denote
l(u) = Eu
Z 1
u
eA(u; s)(s) exp  Z s
u
kdk

ds

;
and note that l(u) = 0 when u  T , due to eA(T; s)  0 by the denition of eA(t1; t2):
With this new notation, we have
WA(t) = E
n
D(t; 1)(R1(1; T ) K)+E
 eA(1; 2)jF1Fto
= E
h
D(t; 1)(R1(1; T ) K)+l(1)
Fti
= Et
Z T
t
D(t; s)(s)(Rs(s; T ) K)+l(s)ds

:
Since D(0; t)v1(t) +
R t
0
D(t; s)(s)(Rs(s; T ) K)+l(s)ds is a martingale. we obtain
the PDE for WA(t) as
(@t + L)WA + (f  WA)  rWA = 0 (II.3.7)
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with WA(T; r; ) = 0, where f = l(t)(Rt(t; T ) K)+ and
L = a1(b1   r)@r + 1
2
21r@rr + a2(b2   )@ +
1
2
22@ + 12
p
r@r:
By Corollary II.3.5, we have
l(u) = Eu
Z 1
u
( eA(u; T ) D(u; s) eA(s; T ))(s)exp Z s
u
kdk

ds

= Eu
Z 1
u
eA(u; T )(s)exp Z s
u
kdk

ds

  Eu
Z 1
u
eA(s; T )(s)D(u; s)exp Z s
u
kdk

ds

= eA(u; T )Eu Z 1
u
(s)exp

 
Z s
u
kdk

ds

  Eu
Z 1
u
eA(s; T )(s)D^(u; s)ds :
By Theorem II.3.3, we have Eu
R1
u
(s)exp
   R s
u
kdk

ds

= 1, then
l(u) = eA(u; T )  Eu Z 1
u
eA(s; T )(s)D^(u; s)ds :
Denote
h(u) = Eu
Z 1
u
eA(s; T )(s)D^(u; s)ds :
Since eA(s; T ) = 0 for s > T , and eA(s; T ) = As(s; T ) for s < T , we have
h(u) = Eu
Z 1
u
As(s; T )(s)D^(u; s)ds

:
It can be veried that
D^(0; u)h(u) +
Z u
0
D^(0; s)(s)As(s; T )ds
is a martingale, which yields the PDE for h(u) as
(@t + L)h+ (f   h)  rh = 0 (II.3.8)
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with h(T; r; ) = 0, where f = At(t; T ) and
L = a1(b1   r)@r + 1
2
21r@rr + a2(b2   )@ +
1
2
22@ + 12
p
r@r:
After we obtain h(t), we can nd l(t) using l(t) = eA(t; T ) h(t) and solve the PDE
for WA(t).
II.3.1.2 PDE for of WB(t)
From (II.3.6), we have
WB(t) = E
h
D(t; 2) eA(2; T )(R2(2; T ) K)+Fti
= E
h
D(t; 1)E
h eA(2; T )(R2(2; T ) K)+P (1; 2)F1i Fti
= E

D(t; 1)E1
Z T
1
eA(s; T )(Rs(s; T ) K)+(s)D(1; s)ds Ft :
Here we have used Lemma II.2.1. Let
p(u) = Eu
Z T
u
eA(s; T )(Rs(s; T ) K)+(s)D(u; s)ds :
When s  T , since eA(s; T ) = As(s; T ) by denition, we can rewrite p(u) as
p(u) = Eu
Z T
u
As(s; T )(Rs(s; T ) K)+(s)D(u; s)ds

:
Thus,
WB(t) = E

D(t; 1)p(1)
Ft
(by Lemma II:2:1)
= Et
Z T
t
D(t; s)(s)p(s)ds

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It can be veried that D(0; t)g(t)+
R t
0
D(t; s)(s)p(s)ds is a martingale, from which
we obtain the PDE for WB(t) as
(@t + L)WB + (p WB)  rWB = 0 (II.3.9)
with WB(T; r; ) = 0, where
L = a1(b1   r)@r + 1
2
21r@rr + a2(b2   )@ +
1
2
22@ + 12
p
r@r:
Since p(u) = Eu
hR T
u
As(s; T )(Rs(s; T ) K)+(s)D(u; s)ds
i
is dened similarly as
the value in equation (II.2.9), we can derive the PDE for p(u) in a similar way,
which is given by
(@t + L)p+ (f   p)  rp = 0 (II.3.10)
with p(T; r; ) = 0, where
L = a1(b1   r)@r + 1
2
21r@rr + a2(b2   )@ +
1
2
22@ + 12
p
r@r ;
f = At(t; T )(Rt(t; T ) K)+:
II.3.1.3 CCIRS Price W (t)
We solveWA(t; r; ) using two PDEs (II.3.7)-(II.3.8) andWB(t; r; ) using (II.3.9)-
(II.3.10) numerically with the ADI nite dierence method. We can then obtain
the nal CCIRS price using W (t; r; ) = WA(t; r; ) +WB(t; r; ):
II.3.2 Results
II.3.2.1 Verications
We used the same parameters given in the previous section. In the Monte-Carlo
simulations, we run 1,000,000 realizations and partition the 5 year to maturity into
2,000 equal parts. The computational time is 660 seconds and the price is $2,223.51.
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The reliability of PDE usually lies on its convergence test. To test the stability
and convergence of our PDE, we have done the convergence test in Appendix A. The
results in this Appendix give us condence that our numerical results are reliable.
After this convergence test, we cover the time, interest rate, hazard rate with a
600 100 100 grid and solve this PDE. The computational time is 4.07 seconds,
due to the fact that we need to solve four PDEs. The CCIRS price is $2,263.50. We
can see these results are consistent to the ones from the Monte-Carlo simulation.
The comparison is given in Table 5.
The PDE technique can also provide the solution on any point of the grid. We
have chosen a simulated path for r and . Using the same time for calculating the
price of CCIRS with 2-default, we quickly got the price on each annual node. The
results are shown in Table 6.
II.4 CCIRS: Full Problem
In the previous section we showed that the model based on one default under-
estimate CCIRS price, by comparing the additional cost to the one-default price.
In this section, we consider the full problem where no restriction on the number of
defaults is imposed.
II.4.1 A New PDE
Without any restriction on the number of defaults, we have developed a more
accurate model that gives the precise price of CCIRS. The CCIRS value at t is the
expected value of all the losses after the rst default 1(1 > t).
Case1, if 1  T , the value is 0.
Case2, if 1 < T , at time 1, the new CCIRS should cover all the losses starting
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from 2, but it does not cover the loss between 1 and 2.
Now in case 2, we can discuss 2 other cases. Case2-1, if 2  T , the the loss
between 1 and 2 is f(1) (i.e. A1(1; T )(R1(1; T ) K)+).
Case2-2, if 2 < T , the the loss between 1 and 2 is A1(1; 2)(R1(1; T ) K)+.
So by combining two cases, we can write
W (t) = E
h
D(t; 1)fW (1; 2)Fti (II.4.1)
where
fW (t1; t2) =
8<: 0 t1  T ;W (t1) + ef(t1; t2); t1 < T , (II.4.2)
and
ef(t1; t2) =
8<: At1(t1; T )(Rt1(t1; T ) K)+; t1 < T  t2 ;At1(t1; t2)(Rt1(t1; T ) K)+ t1 < t2 < T . (II.4.3)
Or simply rewrite the formula of fW (t1; t2) using the notation in equation (II.3.2),
fW (t1; t2) =
8<: 0 t1  T ;W (t1) + eA(t1; t2)(Rt1(t1; T ) K)+ t1 < T . (II.4.4)
So the way to get the PDE should be the same complexity as the 2-default case
following the similar procedures.
(@t + L)W + f   rW = 0 (II.4.5)
with W (T ) = 0, where f = l(t)(Rt(t; T ) K)+. l(t) is dened in previous section
as:
l(u) = Eu
Z 1
u
eA(u; s)(s) exp  Z s
u
kdk

ds

:
Solving l(u) has been done as well. l(t) = eA(t; T )  h(t) and PDE for h(t) is
(@t + L)h+ (f   h)  rh = 0 (II.4.6)
with h(T; r; ) = 0, where f = At(t; T ).
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II.4.2 Numerics
To compare the prices of the one-default, two-default and full model (ie., the
model without restriction on the default numbers), the parameters have been chosen
the same as previous tests. The results are shown in the Table 7. The PDE solution
of the dierence of full model price and two-default prices for dierent initial interest
rate and hazard rate is in Figure 2 and Figure 3. The PDE solution of the dierence
of two-default and one-default prices for dierent initial interest rate and hazard
rate is in Figure 3. On top of that, we have also shown the dierence of these prices
with respect to dierent correlations between the interest rate and hazard rate in
Table 8.
These comparisons provide us the rst impression that the second and more
defaults can have non-trivial eect on the CCIRS price. In the next section, we
will more clear knowledge about the second and more default impact by applying
a thorough risk exposure analysis.
II.5 Risk Exposure Analysis
In actual markets, most exposures of the credit products come from the credit
risk exposure, notional exposure and maturity exposure. Certainly, the interest rate
exposure should be included in CCIRS pricing model. Since the notion is a constant
and proportional to the price of CCIRS, only the other three kinds of mentioned
exposures will be examined by comparing prices under two dierent models in this
section.
From the simulation results, we found Monte Carlo method can only provide
a large range of results. This instability may have impact on the risk exposure
analysis and leads to a wrong conclusion. In this section, only PDEs technique has
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been applied and achieved a great results.
First we have weighed the impact of hazard rate model parameters of dierent
ratings on one, two defaults and the full models. We used the parameters in Table
2 and Table 3 to achieve more reasonable results. Maturity is now 10 years,  = 0:2
and K = 1%. The values of three dierent models are shown in Table 9. We can
see if the counterparty has a high credit ratings (AAA or AA), these three prices
in Table 9 are very close. If the counterparty has a medium credit ratings (A or
BBB), the dierence between these three prices are small but not noticeable. If
the counterparty has a low credit ratings (BB or B), the dierence between these
three prices are huge and cannot be ignored. We have a rst insight of these three
models and how they behaved with respect to dierent ratings.
The second test we have done is the impact of the long term average hazard rate
on the prices of three models, under the assumption that the initial hazard rate
equals the long term average hazard rate. The results can be can be observed clearly
in Figure 4. We found when the long term average hazard rate is larger, the value
is larger. This can be easily understood because when the hazard rate is higher,
the two-default model captures more exposures and the full model without the
restriction on the default numbers captures the real exposures. More risk exposures
means higher prices.
From the previous two test, since the dierence of three values is generally very
small for high rating counterparties, it is hard to test the impact of other parameters
on the comparison ratios if we choose AAA and AA as the testing grade. Among
the other four credit ratings, A is always used as a standard testing rating and the
testing of B rating will generate the most visible impact on the dierence. So in
the rest of the tests, we used the parameters close to the rating A and B to see how
the parameters can aect the values of three models and their comparison ratios.
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In the next step, the impact on CCIRS price of reverting speed and volatility of
hazard rate on three model prices have been tested as well. The prices comparison
from rating A and B are shown in Table 10 and Table 12. The ratios comparison
of two-default model price/one-default model price and the full model price/one-
default model price from rating A and B are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 7. The
parameters for interest rate are from Table 2. The results show the values and
the ratios are not that sensitive to the hazard rate volatility and reverting speed.
Combined this new results and the results from the rst and second test above, we
can say that the value of hazard rate itself plays a major role in aecting the ratio
of the two default model price and the full model price.
In the second groups of tests, the impact of the interest rate on the three model
prices has been assessed. In the rst test, the initial and long term average interest
rate is ranging from 0.4% to 2%, a1 is chosen to be 0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2 respectively.
The other parameters are chosen as rating A and B parameters in Table 3. The
notional value is $250,000,000,  = 0:2, Maturity is 5 years and K = 0:5%. The
dierent model prices with dierent chosen parameters have been put in Table
1421. From these results, we nd when the interest rate is larger, all three values
increase quickly. This behavior can be easily explained. The CCIRS price mainly
relies on the excessive amount of the new xed rate over the old one. From equation
(II.2.6), it is easy to prove that if the interest rate is constant, the reasonable xed
rate of the swap is very close to the interest rate. So when the long term average
interest rate is larger, it has higher probability to sign a new contract with a higher
xed rate, i.e. the value of CCIRS is higher.
The comparison of ratios of two-default value/one-default price and the full
value/one-default price are shown in Figure 916. The observations from these
results are more complicated. Actually there are three factors aecting the ratios.
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These three factors are number of defaults, reverting speed of interest rate and the
trend of interest rate change. Because of the complexity of these eects from the
three factors, we discuss them in two cases.
In the rst case when the long term average is smaller than K, the number of
defaults and the reverting speed dominates the ratios. The reason for this dom-
ination is intuitive. When the interest rate is low, it is less likely to sign a new
xed rate higher than K. So on the one hand more defaults actually provides more
chances of signing a higher xed rate. So in this case more defaults mean higher
price of CCIRS. On the other hand when the reverting speed of interest rate is
larger, the interest rate will concentrate more around the average. So when the
average is smaller than K, lower reverting speed can provide more randomness of
the interest rate to be higher than K. Then again, more defaults means higher
price.
In the second case when the long term average is above K, the eect of number
of defaults becomes less important. Because when average is already higher than
K, the xed rate signed at the rst default time is likely to be more thanK, so more
defaults did not provide much more chances of signing higher xed rate. Especially
when the reverting speed is large, it is very obvious that all values become close to
each other when the average rate is around and above K.
The other observation we found is for very large average rate, the two-default
value can be even smaller and the full value is the smallest. To better understand
this phenomenon, we have run two new tests.
We wanted to test the three model prices when the interest rate will gradually
increase or gradually decrease. So in the rst new test, we let the initial interest
rate be 0.549% and long term average rate ranges from 0.6% to 5%. In the second
new test, we let the initial interest rate be 4% and long term average rate ranges
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from 0.4% to 2%. The reverting speed of interest rate is 0.1. The parameters of
hazard rate model is chosen as the parameters for rating B. K = 1%, maturity is
10 years and  = 0:2. The results are shown in Figure 18 and Figure 20. In test 1
where the interest rate gradually increases, the newer xed rate after each default
will likely be larger. So intuitively the two-default value is larger and the full value
is the largest, as proved by the results in Figure 18. However, when the interest rate
gradually decreases, the newer xed rate after each default will likely be lower. In
this case, the CCIRS holder can actually take benet from more defaults. Because
the two-default price can be lower and full price is the lowest.
In the next test, the eect of the volatility of interest rate is tested as well and
the three model prices are in Table 22 and Table 23. The ratios comparison of
two-default model price/one-default model price and full model price/one-default
model price from rating A and B are shown in Figure 21 and Figure 22. The other
parameters are chosen as in Table 2 and Table 3. K = 1%,  = 0:2 and maturity
is 10 years. The results reect that volatility provides higher chance of signing the
new xed rate higher than K and pushes the value higher. And in this case when
the average rate is close to K, more possible defaults actually brings more chances
of signing higher xed rate as well. The combination of these two eects leads to
the higher ratio of two defaults value and full model value to one default value when
the volatility is higher.
The last test studies the maturity exposure in three dierent default model.
The maturity is chosen from 5 years to 15 years. The initial and long term average
interest rate are 4% and the initial and long term average hazard rate are 10%. The
results shown in Table 24 and Table 25. The ratios comparison of the two-default
model price/one-default model price and the full model price/one-default model
price from rating A and B are shown in Figure 23 and Figure 24. The results follow
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the intuition as well. More possible defaults will happen with longer maturity.
When the average interest rate is around the K, more defaults lead to greater risk
of getting higher xed rate than one default.
After these analyses of risk exposures, it is reasonable to conclude that the
eect of the possible second default or more defaults in CCIRS pricing model can
not be neglected, especially when the risk of default is not low and the interest rate
oats around the original xed swap rate, in which case the sensitive impact of its
randomness greatly aects the two-default price. The two-default model might be
good enough for the pricing of rating A default risk. But for counterparties with
higher default risks, the full model captures the correct risk.
II.6 Chapter Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigated the importance of additional defaults in the
pricing of CCIRS. We compared the results using both the Monte-Carlo simulation
and PDEs based methods. As the PDE approach is computationally more ecient,
it allows us to carry out extensive risk exposure analysis. Our results indicate that
the risk due to the default of the replacement contract in an interest rate swap is
signicant. Therefore, the assumption of a default-free replacement contract may
overestimate or underestimate CCIRS price and the risk exposure due to counter-
party default. The CVA of the second and subsequent defaults can only be ignored
when the credit risk is very low, i.e. when the counterparty has a high credit rating
with short maturity. In addition, our results also show that the interest rate envi-
ronment and maturity of the contract play important roles in the risk composition
of the nal CCIRS price.
One shortcoming of the two-default model is that the eect of subsequent de-
faults is assumed to be small and consequently are not modelled. To overcome
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this shortcoming, we have considered the pricing problem with no restriction on
the number of defaults. The price computed using this full model captures the
real or true cost of the counterparty risk and can be used as a benchmark when
comparing the prices computed using the one-default and two-default model, both
are approximations.
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III An Analytical Value at Risk (VaR)
Approach for Credit Portfolio with Liquidity
Horizon and Portfolio Rebalancing
Current Incremental Risk Charge (IRC) calculation relies on time consuming
Monte Carlo simulation (MC), so the banks still use more ecient Asymptotic
Single Risk Factor (ASRF) and its Granularity Adjustment (GA) as important
measures for the eective capital management for banks. In order to achieve a risk
sensible comparison, we provide a general framework of two-period conditional VaR
model in the context of IRC modeling framework in which the liquidity horizon and
constant level of risk are considered. Compared to the original ASRF model, two-
period conditional VaR model is more practical from the risk point of view when
liquidity risk is added. So nding a proper analytic solution is a very valuable
research work. By borrowing the GA technique, we will then present an analytic
approach to the two-period conditional VaR in this chapter. On top of that, we
will also provide an exact solution to VaR in the innite-period model.
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III.1 General Framework of two period conditional VaR
model
III.1.1 ASRF model for Credit Portfolio and the GA approximation
The general framework of ASRF and its GA are presented in this section. For a
credit portfolio, the loss function within a one-factor modeling framework is dened
as
LN =
NX
i=1
uiIfXi>Uig ; (III.1.1)
Xi = iS +
q
1  2i i ; (III.1.2)
where LN is the portfolio loss, ui is the loss given default of the ith asset, i is
the idiosyncratic factor, i is the positive correlation between asset factor Xi and
systematic factor S, and Ui is the threshold to determine if the default of the ith
trade will happen. S and all the i are assumed to be i.i.d Gaussian variables
N(0; 1).
Denote q() as the q percentile value of random variable. i.e.,
P (X  q(X)) = q : (III.1.3)
Then the q percentile VaR of this portfolio is denoted q(LN), which can be
found by MC.
Although there is no direct analytic solution for the q percentile VaR, its ap-
proximation can be calculated in ASRF. In ASRF, the most important assumption
is that when the portfolio is large enough, the individual risk of each trade will be
diversied away. With this assumption and by the law of large numbers, Gordy
44
(2003) [20] demonstrated:
LN ! E(LN jS); a:s: (III.1.4)
This means q(LN)  q[E(LN jS)]. If the conditional expectation of loss func-
tion f(s) = E[LN jS = s] is monotonic,which is the assumption of most models, we
have q[E(LN jS)] = E(LN jq(S)) because of the monotonic property of q(). If
the loss function is dened as in (III.1.1), we have
q(LN)  q[E(LN jS)]
= q
"
NX
i=1
ui
 
1  
 
Ui   iSp
1  2i
!!#
=
NX
i=1
ui
 
1  
 
Ui   iq(S)p
1  2i
!!
(III.1.5)
This is how the capital requirement calculation (IRB approach) is implemented
based on the ASRF assumption. In practice, however, the innitely ne grained
portfolio does not exist, so there is a dierence between VaR (i.e. q(LN)) and
E(LN jq(S)). The summation of E(LN jq(S)) and the dierence of q(LN) and
q[E(LN jS)] is considered to be the new VaR. This calculation of the dierence is
the main goal of GA.
The key method of GA proposed by Gordy (2003) [20] was the second order
Taylor expansion. We know
q(LN) = q[E(LN jS) + "(LN   E(LN jS))]j"=1 :
Let z(") = q[E(LN jS) + "(LN   E(LN jS))]; applying the second order Taylor
expansion on " = 0, we have,
z(")  z(0) + z0(0)"+ z00(0)"
2
2
: (III.1.6)
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q[E(LN jS) + "(LN   E(LN jS))]j"=1
=z(1)
z(0) + z0(0)  1 + z00(0)  1
2
2
=q[E(LN jS)] + @q
@"
[E(LN jS) + "(LN   E(LN jS))]j"=0
+
1
2
@2q
@"2
[E(LN jS) + "(LN   E(LN jS))]j"=0 : (III.1.7)
Then the value of GA, the dierence between q(LN) and q[E(LN jS)], is ap-
proximately the sum of the rst and the second derivatives. Wilde (2001) [44]
proved that GA can be expressed as
GAN =   1
2h(q(S))
d
dx
 
2(LN jS = x)h(x))
dE(LN jS=x)
dx
!
x=q(S)
; (III.1.8)
where h is the density function of the systematic risk factor S. The detailed ex-
pression of h(x); E(LN jS = x) and 2(LN jS = x) depend on the chosen model.
III.1.2 Analytical VaR with Liquidity Horizon and Portfolio Rebalanc-
ing
III.1.2.1 Two-period Credit Portfolio VaR measure and its ASRF and
GA terms
The two-period credit portfolio valuation and loss model will be described in this
section. In order to model the portfolio rebalancing within one year time horizon,
we divide the one year horizon into two half-year periods. In the rst half, the credit
portfolio follows standard factor model as outlined in III.1.1. Then at the end of the
rst period, the portfolio can be rebalanced according to what happens in the rst
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period. For example, if one asset defaults in the rst period, we choose to replace it
with a similar asset of the same LGD and rating (i.e. same default probability and
asset correlation). Then we can say that at the end of six month, the portfolio is
replenished such that it maintains a constant level of risk. For some assets, we can
also assume that no action is needed. From the default risk perspective, this has
the embedded assumption that this asset has a liquidity horizon of one year. In this
chapter, we assume that all assets have a six month liquidity horizon. Therefore,
we need to model the losses aggregated in two periods with the losses in the second
period conditional on the portfolio rebalancing assumptions.
Let S1; S2 be the realizations of the systematic factor in the end of the rst and
second period. They are assumed to be independent. Similar to one-period default
model (III.1.1), the two-step one-factor default model is:
LN =
NX
i=1
h
uiIfT (i)1 >Uig
+ uiIfT (i)2 >Uig
i
; (III.1.9)
where:
T
(i)
1 = iS1 +
q
1  2i i ; (III.1.10)
T
(i)
2 = iS2 +
q
1  2i 0i ; (III.1.11)
ui is the loss given default of asset i, all the i and 
0
i are the idiosyncratic factors
which are independent across each other and across each systematic factor S1; S2
and i is the positive correlation between asset factor T
(i)
1 and systematic factor
S1. It is the same as the correlation between asset factor T
(i)
2 and systematic factor
S2 since the trade has the same behavior as the trade in the rst period no matter
it defaults or not. Ui is the threshold to determine if the default of the ith trade
will happen. S1; S2 and all the i and 
0
i are assumed to be Gaussian distributed
variables N(0; 1).
Similar to the standard GA, the second order Taylor expansion can be applied.
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Rewrite LN = q[E(LN jS1; S2)] + "[LN   E(LN jS1; S2)]j"=1 :
Use Taylor expansion and proceed as (III.1.7):
q(LN) = q[E(LN jS1; S2)] + "[LN   E(LN jS1; S2)]j"=1
 q[E(LN jS1; S2)] + @q
@"
[E(LN jS1; S2) + "(LN   E(LN jS1; S2))]j"=0
+
1
2
@2q[E(LN jS1; S2) + "(LN   E(LN jS1; S2))]
@"2

"=0
: (III.1.12)
If we can calculate the values of the three components of the sum in (III.1.12),
we will know the VaR of this portfolio. The summation of the rst and the second
derivative is the value of GA.
III.1.2.2 Two-period \ASRF" Term in Equation (III.1.12)
With the formula of LN in (III.1.9), E(LN jS1; S2) is calculated as:
E(LN jS1; S2) =
NX
i=1
n
uiE[IfT (i)1 >Uig
jS1; S2] + uiE[IfT (i)2 >UigjS1; S2]
o
=
NX
i=1
(
ui[1  (Ui   iS1p
1  2i
)]
)
+
NX
i=1
(
ui[1  (Ui   iS2p
1  2i
)]
)
; (III.1.13)
where () is the cumulative distribution function of standard normal distributed
variable. Denote
X = E(LN jS1; S2) ; (III.1.14)
l(s) =
NX
i=1
(
ui[1  (Ui   isp
1  2i
)]
)
: (III.1.15)
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So (III.1.13) can be simply written as
X = l(S1) + l(S2) : (III.1.16)
Since i is always positive, it is obvious that l(s) is a strictly monotonically
increasing function and
lim
s! 1
l(s) = 0 ; (III.1.17)
lim
s!+1
l(s) =
NX
i=1
ui : (III.1.18)
To simplify the rest narrations in this chapter, the limit of any function f()
will be rewritten as:
f(1) = lim
x!1
f(x) : (III.1.19)
So the limits of function l are rewritten as:
l( 1) = 0 ; (III.1.20)
l(+1) =
NX
i=1
ui : (III.1.21)
To calculate q(X), the cumulative distribution function of X needs to be cal-
culated, which is
FX(t) = P (X  t) : (III.1.22)
From (III.1.17) and (III.1.18), function l(s) is bounded between 0 and
PN
i=1 ui.
So
FX(t) =
8<: 0; if t  0 ;1; if t  2PNi=1 ui . (III.1.23)
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For any 0 < t < 2
PN
i=1 ui,
X  t
, l(S1) + l(S2)  t
,
8>>><>>>:
fS2  l 1(t  l(S1)); S1 > l 1(t 
PN
i=1 ui)gSfS2 2 R; S1  l 1(t PNi=1 ui)g; t PNi=1 ui ;
fS2  l 1(t  l(S1)); S1 < l 1(t)g; t <
PN
i=1 ui .
(III.1.24)
The FX(t) in both cases can be calculated given the systematic factor S1 and
S2 are normally distributed and uncorrelated. The density function of X will be
calculated here for future use.
(i) In the rst case, i.e. 2
PN
i=1 ui > t 
PN
i=1 ui,
FX(t) =
Z +1
l 1(t PNi=1 ui) (s1)(l
 1(t  l(s1)))ds1 + (l 1(t 
NX
i=1
ui)) ; (III.1.25)
where () is the density function of the standard normal random variable. Note
when t =
PN
i=1 ui, FX(t) =
R +1
 1 (s1)(l
 1(t   l(s1)))ds1. This does not vio-
late the formula of FX(t) in (III.1.25) with the notation (III.1.19), i.e. ( 1) =
limx!1(x) = 0.
To calculate fX(t), the following propositions are required.
Proposition III.1.1 let F (t) =
R a(t)
b(t)
f(t; x)dx, where f(t; x) 2 C(D), @f(t;x)
@t
2
C(D), D = f(x; t)jx 2 [; ]; t 2 [m;n]g, C(D) is the set of all continuous functions
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on D. a0(t) and b0(t) exist when t 2 [m;n]. And   a(t)  ;   b(t)  . then
F 0(t) = f(t; a(t))a0(t)  f(t; b(t))b0(t) +
Z a(t)
b(t)
@f(t; x)
@t
dx : (III.1.26)
Proposition III.1.2
dl 1(t)
dt
=
1
l0(l 1(t))
: (III.1.27)
Then use Proposition III.1.1 and Proposition III.1.2 in the calculation of fX(t).
When t 6=PNi=1 ui,
fX(t) = F
0
X(t)
=  (l 1(t 
NX
i=1
ui))(l
 1(
NX
i=1
ui))
1
l0(l 1(t PNi=1 ui))
+
Z +1
l 1(t PNi=1 ui) (s1)(l
 1(t  l(s1))) 1
l0(l 1(t  l(s1)))ds1
+ (l 1(t 
NX
i=1
ui))
1
l0(l 1(t PNi=1 ui))
(Since (l 1(
NX
i=1
ui)) = (+1) = 1)
=  (l 1(t 
NX
i=1
ui))
1
l0(l 1(t PNi=1 ui))
+
Z +1
l 1(t PNi=1 ui) (s1)(l
 1(t  l(s1))) 1
l0(l 1(t  l(s1)))ds1
+ (l 1(t 
NX
i=1
ui))
1
l0(l 1(t PNi=1 ui))
=
Z +1
l 1(t PNi=1 ui) (s1)(l
 1(t  l(s1))) 1
l0(l 1(t  l(s1)))ds1 :
(III.1.28)
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When t =
PN
i=1 ui,
fX(t) = F
0
X(t)
=
Z +1
 1
(s1)(l
 1(t  l(s1))) 1
l0(l 1(t  l(s1)))ds1
(since l 1(0) =  1)
=
Z +1
l 1(t PNi=1 ui) (s1)(l
 1(t  l(s1))) 1
l0(l 1(t  l(s1)))ds1 :
(III.1.29)
So in case (i),
fX(t) =
Z +1
l 1(t PNi=1 ui) (s1)(l
 1(t  l(s1))) 1
l0(l 1(t  l(s1)))ds1 : (III.1.30)
(ii) In the second case, i.e. 0 < t <
PN
i=1 ui,
FX(t) =
Z l 1(t)
 1
(s1)(l
 1(t  l(s1)))ds1 ; (III.1.31)
Similarly, use Proposition III.1.1 and Proposition III.1.2 to calculate fX(t).
fX(t) = (l
 1(t))(l 1(t  t)) 1
l0(l 1(t))
+
Z l 1(t)
 1
(s1)(l
 1(t  l(s1))) 1
l0(l 1(t  l(s1)))ds1
(Since (l 1(t  t)) = ( 1) = 0)
=
Z l 1(t)
 1
(s1)(l
 1(t  l(s1))) 1
l0(l 1(t  l(s1)))ds1 : (III.1.32)
52
Following are the values of fX(t) on two boundaries in both cases. In case (i)
when t =
PN
i=1 ui,
f(t) =
Z +1
 1
(s1)(l
 1(t  l(s1))) 1
l0(l 1(t  l(s1)))ds1 ; (III.1.33)
and in case (ii) when t!PNi=1 ui,
lim
t!PNi=1 ui f(t) =
Z +1
 1
(s1)(l
 1(t  l(s1))) 1
l0(l 1(t  l(s1)))ds1 : (III.1.34)
In case (i) when t! 2PNi=1 ui,
lim
t!2PNi=1 ui fX(t) =
Z +1
+1
(s1)(l
 1(t  l(s1))) 1
l0(l 1(t  l(s1)))ds1 = 0 ; (III.1.35)
and in case (ii) when t! 0,
lim
t!0
fX(t) =
Z  1
 1
(s1)(l
 1(t  l(s1))) 1
l0(l 1(t  l(s1)))ds1 = 0 : (III.1.36)
The two conditions (III:1:33) = (III:1:34) and (III:1:35) = (III:1:36) = 0
give the continuity of the density function for all t 2 R.
Then
fX(t) =8>>><>>>:
R +1
l 1(t PNi=1 ui) (s1)(l 1(t  l(s1))) 1l0(l 1(t l(s1)))ds1; if 2
PN
i=1 ui > t 
PN
i=1 ui ;R l 1(t)
 1 (s1)(l
 1(t  l(s1))) 1l0(l 1(t l(s1)))ds1; if
PN
i=1 ui > t  0 ;
0; otherwise .
(III.1.37)
To simplify the expression of fX(t), dene a function gt(s1) on(
(t; s1)
(t; s1) 2
"
NX
i=1
ui; 2
NX
i=1
ui
!

 
l 1(t 
NX
i=1
ui);+1
!
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["
0;
NX
i=1
ui
!

 
 1; l 1(t)
!)
(III.1.38)
as
gt(s1) = l
 1(t  l(s1)): (III.1.39)
Since l(x) is a strictly monotonically increasing function, gt(s1) is a strictly
monotonically decreasing function w.r.t s1.
Dene an interval 
(t) as:

(t) =
8<: (l 1(t 
PN
i=1 ui);+1); Case 1: 2
PN
i=1 ui > t 
PN
i=1 ui ;
( 1; l 1(t)); Case 2: PNi=1 ui > t > 0 .
(III.1.40)
Then
fX(t) =
8<:
R

(t)
(s1)(gt(s1))(l
0(gt(s1))) 1ds1; if 2
PN
i=1 ui > t  0 ;
0; otherwise .
(III.1.41)
Then using (III.1.25) and (III.1.31) to solve the q(X) numerically from equa-
tion
FX(q(X)) = q : (III.1.42)
III.1.2.3 Calculate the Second Term in Equation (III.1.12)
Dene Y = LN   E(LN jS1; S2), then the rst order term can be rewritten as
@q(X + "Y )
@"

"=0
: (III.1.43)
Here Rau-Bredow(2002) [36] proved the following theorem.
54
Theorem III.1.3 Consider two random variables X and Y with a joint density
function f(x; y) and q() is dened in the same way as in this chapter. Then:
@q(X + "Y )
@"
= E [Y jX + "Y = q(X + "Y )] ; (III.1.44)
@2q(X + "Y )
@"2
= (III.1.45)
 

@2(Y jX + "Y = s)
@s
+ 2(Y jX + "Y = s)@lnfX+"Y (s)
@s

s=q(X+"Y )
;
(III.1.46)
where fX+"Y (s) is the density function of X + "Y and 
2(Y jX + "Y = s) is the
conditional variance of Y .
Using Theorem III.1.3:
@q(X + "Y )
@"

"=0
= E [Y jX = q(X)]
= E[LN   E(LN jS1; S2)jE(LN jS1; S2) = q(E(LN jS1; S2))]
= E[LN jE(LN jS1; S2) = q(E(LN jS1; S2))]
  E[E(LN jS1; S2)jE(LN jS1; S2) = q(E(LN jS1; S2))] :
(III.1.47)
Since E(LN jS1; S2) is (S1; S2)-measurable, and
(E(LN jS1; S2) = q(E(LN jS1; S2)))  (S1; S2);
by tower property,
E[E(LN jS1; S2)jE(LN jS1; S2) = q(E(LN jS1; S2))]
= E[LN jE(LN jS1; S2) = q(E(LN jS1; S2))] : (III.1.48)
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So
@q(X + "Y )
@"

"=0
= 0 : (III.1.49)
It is elaborate that the rst derivative of two-period GA, as well as the rst
derivative of one-period GA, are both 0.
III.1.2.4 Calculate the Third Term in Equation (III.1.12)
Using Theorem III.1.3:
1
2
@2q[E(LN jS1; S2) + "(LN   E(LN jS1; S2))]
@"2

"=0
=
1
2
@2q(X + "Y )
@"2

"=0
=  1
2

@2(Y jX = s)
@s
+ 2(Y jX = s)dlnfX(s)
ds

s=q(X)
: (III.1.50)
First, the value of 2(Y jX = s) is required:
2(Y jX = s) = 2(LN  XjX = s)
= 2(LN   sjX = s)
= 2(LN jX = s)
= E(L2N jX = s)  E2(LN jX = s) : (III.1.51)
Then E(LN jX = s) and E(L2N jX = s) are calculated for the value of 2(Y jX =
s) in section III.1.2.4.1 and III.1.2.4.2.
Second, the derivative of the variance (i.e. @
2(Y jX=s)
@s
) is calculated in section
III.1.2.4.3.
Finally, dlnfX(s)
ds
is calculated in section III.1.2.4.4.
III.1.2.4.1 Calculate E(LN jX = s)
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Please recall the loss function LN is dened as
LN =
NX
i=1
h
uiIfT (i)1 >Uig
+ uiIfT (i)2 >Uig
i
; (III.1.52)
where:
T
(i)
1 = iS1 +
q
1  2i i ; (III.1.53)
T
(i)
2 = iS2 +
q
1  2i 0i ; (III.1.54)
ui is the loss given default of asset i, all the i and 
0
i are the idiosyncratic factors
which are independent across each other and across each systematic factor S1; S2
and i is the correlation between asset factor T
(i)
1 and systematic factor S1. It
is the same as the correlation between asset factor T
(i)
2 and systematic factor S2
since the trade has the same behavior as the trade in the rst period no matter
it defaults or not. Ui is the threshold to determine if the default of the ith trade
will happen. S1; S2 and all the i and 
0
i are assumed to be Gaussian distributed
variables N(0; 1).
Then
E(LN jX = s) = E
(
NX
i=1
h
uiIfT (i)1 >Uig
+ uiIfT (i)2 >Uig
i
jX = s
)
=
NX
i=1
n
uiE[IfT (i)1 >Uig
jX = s] + uiE[IfT (i)2 >UigjX = s]
o
:
(III.1.55)
By symmetry,
E[IfT (i)1 >Uig
jX = s] = E[IfT (i)2 >UigjX = s] (8i = 1; 2; :::; N) : (III.1.56)
So the formulas for E[IfT (i)1 >Uig
jX = s] are enough to give the value of E(LN jX =
s).
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Remember X = l(S1) + l(S2) is dened in (III.1.15). Proposition B.1 in the
Appendix B can be directly applied. To simplify the calculation, the denition in
(III.1.41) will be used:
E[IfT (i)1 >Uig
jX = s]
= E[IfiS1+
p
1 2i i>Uig
jX = s]
=
1
fX(s)
Z +1
 1
Z
s12
(s)
Ifis1+
p
1 2i x>Uig
(x)(s1)(gs(s1))(l
0(gs(s1))) 1dxds1
=
1
fX(s)
Z
s12
(s)
Z +1
Ui is1p
1 2i
(x)(s1)(gs(s1))(l
0(gs(s1))) 1dxds1
=
1
fX(s)
Z
s12
(s)
"
1  
 
Ui   is1p
1  2i
!#
(s1)(gs(s1))(l
0(gs(s1))) 1ds1 :
(III.1.57)
Then all E[IfT (i)1 >Uig
jX = s] are able to be calculated based on formula (III.1.57).
Following the equation (III.1.56), all E[IfT (i)2 >Uig
jX = s] are known by symmetry.
Then E(LN jX = s) is calculated by equation (III.1.55).
III.1.2.4.2 Calculate E(L2N jX = s)
First,
E(L2N jX = s)
= E
8<:
(
NX
i=1
h
uiIfT (i)1 >Uig
+ uiIfT (i)2 >Uig
i)2X = s
9=;
= E
8<:
NX
i=1
u2i IfT (i)1 >Uig
+
NX
i;j=1(i 6=j)
uiujIfT (i)1 >Uig
IfT (j)1 >Ujg
+
NX
i=1
u2i IfT (i)2 >Uig
+
NX
i;j=1(i6=j)
uiujIfT (i)2 >Uig
IfT (j)2 >Ujg
+
NX
i;j=1
uiujIfT (i)1 >Uig
IfT (j)2 >Ujg
58
+
NX
i;j=1
uiujIfT (i)2 >Uig
IfT (j)1 >Ujg
X = s
)
=
NX
i=1
u2iE

IfT (i)1 >Uig
jX = s

+
NX
i;j=1(i 6=j)
uiujE

IfT (i)1 >Uig
IfT (j)1 >Ujg
jX = s

+
NX
i=1
u2iE

IfT (i)2 >Uig
jX = s

+
NX
i;j=1(i6=j)
uiujE

IfT (i)2 >Uig
IfT (j)2 >Ujg
jX = s

+ 2
NX
i;j=1
uiujE

IfT (i)1 >Uig
IfT (j)2 >Ujg
jX = s

: (III.1.58)
A property of indicator function, which is I2feventg = Ifeventg, has been used in
this calculation.
Second, in order to calculate E(L2N jX = s), the values of the following are
required:
E

IfT (i)1 >Uig
jX = s

, E

IfT (i)1 >Uig
IfT (j)1 >Ujg
jX = s

, E

IfT (i)2 >Uig
jX = s

,
E

IfT (i)2 >Uig
IfT (j)2 >Ujg
jX = s

and E

IfT (i)1 >Uig
IfT (j)2 >Ujg
jX = s

.
Again, by symmetry,
E

IfT (i)1 >Uig
jX = s

= E

IfT (i)2 >Uig
jX = s

; (III.1.59)
E

IfT (i)1 >Uig
IfT (j)1 >Ujg
jX = s

= E

IfT (i)2 >Uig
IfT (j)2 >Ujg
jX = s

; (III.1.60)
E

IfT (i)1 >Uig
IfT (j)2 >Ujg
jX = s

= E

IfT (j)1 >Ujg
IfT (i)2 >Uig
jX = s

: (III.1.61)
The value of E

IfT (i)1 >Uig
jX = s

has already been calculated in section III.1.2.4.1.
Similarly, apply Proposition B.1 in the Appendix B to calculate
E

IfT (i)1 >Uig
IfT (j)1 >Ujg
jX = s

and E

IfT (i)1 >Uig
IfT (j)2 >Ujg
jX = s

as:
E

IfT (i)1 >Uig
IfT (j)1 >Ujg
jX = s

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= E
h
IfiS1+
p
1 2i i>Uig
IfjS1+
p
1 2jj>UjgjX = s
i
=
1
fX(s)
Z +1
 1
Z +1
 1
Z
s12
(s)
Ifis1+
p
1 2i x1>Uig
Ifjs1+
p
1 2jx2>Ujg
 (x1)(x2)(s1)(gs(s1))(l0(gs(s1))) 1dx1dx2ds1
=
Z
s12
(s)
Z +1
Ui is1p
1 2i
Z +1
Uj js1p
1 2j
(x1)(x2)(s1)(gs(s1))(l
0(gs(s1))) 1dx1dx2ds1  1
fX(s)
=
Z
s12
(s)
"
1  
 
Ui   is1p
1  2i
!#241  
0@Uj   js1q
1  2j
1A35
 (s1)(gs(s1))(l0(gs(s1))) 1ds1  1
fX(s)
: (III.1.62)
E

IfT (i)1 >Uig
IfT (j)2 >Ujg
jX = s

= E
h
IfiS1+
p
1 2i i>Uig
IfjS2+
p
1 2j0j>UjgjX = s
i
= E
h
IfiS1+
p
1 2i i>Uig
Ifjgs(S1)+
p
1 2j0j>UjgjX = s
i
=
1
fX(s)
Z +1
 1
Z +1
 1
Z
s12
(s)
Ifis1+
p
1 2i x>Uig
Ifjgs(s1)+
p
1 2jx0>Ujg
 (x)(x0)(s1)(gs(s1))(l0(gs(s1))) 1dxdx0ds1
=
Z
s12
(s)
Z +1
Ui is1p
1 2i
Z +1
Uj jgs(s1)p
1 2j
(x)(x0)(s1)(gs(s1))(l0(gs(s1))) 1dxdx0ds1  1
fX(s)
=
Z
s12
(s)
"
1  
 
Ui   is1p
1  2i
!#241  
0@Uj   jgs(s1)q
1  2j
1A35
 (s1)(gs(s1))(l0(gs(s1))) 1ds1  1
fX(s)
: (III.1.63)
Finally, E(L2N jX = s) is calculated based on the formulas (III.1.57), (III.1.62)
and (III.1.63).
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So now 2(Y jX = s) can be calculated through (III.1.51).
III.1.2.4.3 Calculate @
2(Y jX=s)
@s
In (III.1.51), we showed that
2(Y jX = s) = E(L2N jX = s)  E2(LN jX = s) ; (III.1.64)
together with the results we proved in (III.1.55) and (III.1.58) , @
2(Y jX=s)
@s
can be
calculated step by step by calculating each following terms:
@E

IfT (i)1 >Uig
jX = s

@s
; (III.1.65)
@E

IfT (i)1 >Uig
IfT (j)1 >Ujg
jX = s

@s
; (III.1.66)
@E

IfT (i)1 >Uig
IfT (j)2 >Ujg
jX = s

@s
: (III.1.67)
Some preparations are required before the calculation is proceeded. First, the
derivative of function gs(s1) with respect to s is calculated as:
@gs(s1)
@s
=
@l 1(s  l(s1))
@s
=
1
l0(l 1(s  l(s1)))
=
1
l0(gs(s1))
: (III.1.68)
Second, dene a new function () as:
(s; s1) =
@(gs(s1))
@s
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= 0(gs(s1))
@gs(s1)
@s
= 0(gs(s1))
1
l0(gs(s1))
: (III.1.69)
Third, nd the formulas for f 0X(s).
Equation (III.1.41) gives the density function of fX(s).
However, the values of limx!1
l0(x)
(x)
are required before the analytic formula of
f 0X(s) is derived.
lim
x!1
l0(x)
(x)
= lim
x!1
NX
i=1
8<:ui ip1  2i exp
24 1
2
 
Ui   ixp
1  2i
!2
+
1
2
x2
359=;
= lim
x!1
NX
i=1
8<:uiiexp
h
  1
2(1 2i )
i
p
1  2i
exp

(22i   1)x2   2iUix+ U2i
9=;
= 0 or 1 : (III.1.70)
From (III.1.70), limx!1
l0(x)
(x)
is1 or 0 based on dierent sets of pre-determined
fig. If limx!1 l0(x)(x) = 0, i.e. limx!1 (x)l0(x) = 1, the continuity in a closed area
condition of Proposition III.1.1 is not satised. So the formula of f 0X(s) cannot
be derived by applying Proposition III.1.1 when s 6= PNi=1 ui. In this case, the
f 0X(s) can only be calculated numerically. And then all the rst derivatives of the
conditional expectations have to be calculated numerically using simple numerically
partial dierential equation technique. In the rest of this chapter, it is assumed that,
limx!1
(x)
l0(x) = 0 .
With this assumption, Proposition III.1.1 can be applied as follows:
(i) If 2
PN
i=1 ui > s 
PN
i=1 ui,
when s 6=PNi=1 ui,
f 0X(s) =
d
R

(s)
(s1)(gs(s1))
1
l0(gs(s1))
ds1
ds
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=  (l 1(s 
NX
i=1
ui))(gs(l
 1(s 
NX
i=1
ui)))
 1
l0(gs(l 1(s 
PN
i=1 ui)))
1
l0(l 1(s PNi=1 ui))
+
Z

(s)
1
(l0(gs(s1)))2
(s1)

l0(gs(s1))
@((gs(s1))
@s
+ ((gs(s1))
@l0(gs(s1))
@s

ds1
=  (l 1(s 
NX
i=1
ui))

lim
x!+1
(x)
l0(x)

1
l0(l 1(s PNi=1 ui))
+
Z

(s)
1
(l0(gs(s1)))2
(s1)

l0(gs(s1))
@((gs(s1))
@s
+ ((gs(s1))
@l0(gs(s1))
@s

ds1
(It is already assumed limx!+1
(x)
l0(x) = 0)
=
Z

(s)
1
(l0(gs(s1)))2
(s1)

l0(gs(s1))(s; s1) + ((gs(s1))
@l0(gs(s1))
@s

ds1 ;
(III.1.71)
when s =
PN
i=1 ui, 
(s) = ( 1;+1)
f 0X(s) =
Z

(s)
1
(l0(gs(s1)))2
(s1)

l0(gs(s1))(s; s1) + ((gs(s1))
@l0(gs(s1))
@s

ds1 :
(III.1.72)
(ii) If
PN
i=1 ui > s > 0,
f 0X(s) =
d
R

(s)
(s1)(gs(s1))
1
l0(gs(s1))
ds1
ds
=

(l 1(s))(gs(l 1(s)))
1
l0(gs(l 1(s)))
+
Z

(s)
1
(l0(gs(s1)))2
(s1)

l0(gs(s1))
@((gs(s1))
@s
+ ((gs(s1))
@l0(gs(s1))
@s

ds1

=

(l 1(s))

lim
x! 1
(x)
l0(x)

+
Z

(s)
1
(l0(gs(s1)))2
(s1)

l0(gs(s1))
@((gs(s1))
@s
+ ((gs(s1))
@l0(gs(s1))
@s

ds1

63
(It is already assumed limx! 1
(x)
l0(x) = 0)
=
Z

(s)
1
(l0(gs(s1)))2
(s1)

l0(gs(s1))(s; s1) + ((gs(s1))
@l0(gs(s1))
@s

ds1 :
(III.1.73)
We nd out that no matter in case (i) or (ii), the formula for f 0X(s) is the same
as follows
f 0X(s) =
Z

(s)
1
(l0(gs(s1)))2
(s1)

l0(gs(s1))(s; s1) + ((gs(s1))
@l0(gs(s1))
@s

ds1 :
(III.1.74)
To simplify the remaining of the calculations, dene a function p(s; s1) as
p(s; s1) =
1
(l0(gs(s1)))2
(s1)

l0(gs(s1))(s; s1) + ((gs(s1))
@l0(gs(s1))
@s

:
(III.1.75)
So f 0X(s) can be rewritten as
f 0X(s) =
Z

(s)
p(s; s1)ds1 : (III.1.76)
Now we can proceed to the calculation of @
2(Y jX=s)
@s
. From the results in
(III.1.41), (III.1.57), (III.1.68), (III.1.69) and (III.1.76),
@E

IfT (i)1 >Uig
jX = s

@s
=
@

1
fX(s)
R
s12
(s)

1  

Ui is1p
1 2i

(s1)(gs(s1))(l
0(gs(s1))) 1ds1

@s
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=
1
f 2X(s)
8>><>>:
@
R
s12
(s)

1  

Ui is1p
1 2i

(s1)(gs(s1))(l
0(gs(s1))) 1ds1
@s
fX(s)
+
Z
s12
(s)
"
1  
 
Ui   is1p
1  2i
!#
(s1)(gs(s1))(l
0(gs(s1))) 1ds1f 0X(s)
)
=
1
f 2X(s)
(
fX(s)
Z
s12
(s)
"
1  
 
Ui   is1p
1  2i
!#
p(s; s1)ds1
+
Z
s12
(s)
"
1  
 
Ui   is1p
1  2i
!#
(s1)(gs(s1))(l
0(gs(s1))) 1ds1
Z
s12
(s)
p(s; s1)ds1
)
:
(III.1.77)
From the results in (III.1.41),(III.1.62), (III.1.68), (III.1.69) and (III.1.76),
@E

IfT (i)1 >Uig
IfT (j)1 >Ujg
jX = s

@s
=
1
f 2X(s)
8<:fX(s)
Z
s12
(s)
"
1  
 
Ui   is1p
1  2i
!#241  
0@Uj   js1q
1  2j
1A35 p(s; s1)ds1
+
Z
s12
(s)
"
1  
 
Ui   is1p
1  2i
!#241  
0@Uj   js1q
1  2j
1A35
 (s1)(gs(s1))(l0(gs(s1))) 1ds1 
Z
s12
(s)
p(s; s1)ds1

: (III.1.78)
From the results in (III.1.41),(III.1.63), (III.1.68), (III.1.69) and (III.1.76),
@E

IfT (i)1 >Uig
IfT (j)1 >Ujg
jX = s

@s
 (s1)(gs(s1))(l0(gs(s1))) 1ds1f 0X(s)
)
=
1
f 2X(s)
8<:fX(s)
Z
s12
(s)
"
1  
 
Ui   is1p
1  2i
!#8<:
241  
0@Uj   jgs(s1)q
1  2j
1A35 p(s; s1)
65
+
jq
1  2j

0@Uj   jgs(s1)q
1  2j
1A(s1)(gs(s1))(l0(gs(s1))) 2
9=; ds1
+
Z
s12
(s)
"
1  
 
Ui   is1p
1  2i
!#241  
0@Uj   jgs(s1)q
1  2j
1A35
 (s1)(gs(s1))(l0(gs(s1))) 1ds1 
Z
s12
(s)
p(s; s1)ds1

: (III.1.79)
Finally @
2(Y jX=s)
@s
is derived using the results just calculated in (III.1.77), (III.1.78)
and (III.1.79).
III.1.2.4.4 Calculate dlnfX(s)
ds
With the formula of f 0X(s) in (III.1.76),
dlnfX(s)
ds
is easily calculated as
dlnfX(s)
ds
=
1
fX(s)
f 0X(s) : (III.1.80)
Finally, every component of the second order derivative in (III.1.50) has been
derived, and q(LN) could be calculated based on formula (III.1.12).
III.2 Numerical Results
The behavior of our two-period model is illustrated by comparing against the
ASRF, ASRF plus standard (one period) GA, and one-period MC model, two-
period MC model with and without portfolio rebalancing. The two-period MC
model with portfolio rebalancing simulates the portfolio loss as outlined in III.1.9.
If an asset defaults during the rst period, the defaulted asset will be replaced with
one having the same notional and rating in the second period. It can be viewed as
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simplied factor simulation model for IRC. This model serves as the benchmark to
check how good our two-period conditional VaR behaves.
In order to understand the behavior of our model, we also benchmark against
one-period MC model and two-period MC without portfolio rebalancing. In the
latter, the defaulted asset is not replaced, which is the same assumption embedded
in one-period MC and standard ASRF and GA.
In all numerical tests shown below, we assume a credit portfolio in which each
asset is modeled as notional=LGD=1, a specic one-period default probability
(which can be tied to rating from the modeling perspective) and a correlation
within one-factor framework (i.e. each asset is correlated to one common factor).
The VaR at any given percentile is expressed as a percentage of total notional of
the portfolio.
III.2.1 ASRF with standard GA and Two-period Conditional VaR
The general behavior of two-period conditional VaR model are shown in Tables
26 and 27, where we show the 99.9 percentile VaR in dierent scenarios computed
by dierent models. In Table 26, we assume a portfolio of 100 assets with uniform
one-period PD being 1 percent and dierent levels of correlation. The correlation
is xed at 0.5 and the number of assets in the portfolio is changed in Table 27. The
following observations can be summarized:
 Compared with one-period MC model, the ASRF and standard one-period
GA behave as expected, which is, when the correlation approaches 1 and
the portfolio become large, ASRF tends to converge with MC results and
standard GA also serves as a reasonable approximation.
 ASRF does not converge to the two-period MC in the case of very large
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portfolio and high correlations. This means that in the presence of liquid-
ity horizon and portfolio rebalancing, the standard one-period ASRF is not
practical enough as an analytical solution to credit portfolio VaR measure, .
 Compared with two-period MC model, the two-period conditional VaR model
serves as a reasonable approximation. It has the same behavior as the stan-
dard GA in a sense that it converges to MC in the case of high correlation
and large portfolio. As shown Appendix C, the order of each error terms is
same as the standard one-period GA approximation.
Figure 25 shows the ratios of ASRF, ASRF plus standard GA, two-period con-
ditional VaR to the two-period MC VaR w.r.t dierent number of assets. It can
be seen that the two-period conditional VaR is a reasonable approximation to the
full simulation model while at the same time, standard ASRF with and without
standard GA is not enough.
One major observation from Tables 26 and 27 is the dierences between two
MC simulations. In order to understand the dierences, we designed an additional
MC model in which the portfolio is not rebalanced. The results of three MC
models at the tail distributions (99 percentile and above) are shown in Figure
26. First of all, given all parameters are same, one-period MC has largest VaR
at most percentile points. When we employ the two-period MC without portfolio
rebalancing, VaR numbers at dierent percentile points become lower. When we
switch on the portfolio rebalancing, VaR numbers become large but still smaller
than that of one-period points. This behavior shows to two competing factors:
 The so called "`correlation leaking"' eect within multi-period factor modeling
framework. Danniel Staumann [39] showed and discussed that the correlated
default scenarios are dierent in one-period and multi-period simulation. In
68
the example here a two-period MC simulation would cut o the possible joint
default events in the rst period and the second period. This will in general
leads to less joint defaults given same level correlation.
 The portfolio rebalancing assumption at the end of rst period means that, if
an asset default in the rst period and get replaced with a similar asset, it can
default again. This will add more default scenarios compared with the one-
period simulation. This is why even in the limitation of perfect correlation,
one-period MC will be dierent from multi-period MC.
Due to the multiple defaults, the 100 percentile for two-period VaR is always
higher than one-period since the entire portfolio can default multiple times. It is
dicult to show in Figure 26 but if we increase the PD to seven percent, we can
clearly see that the computational VaR by one-period and two-period models cross
at the 99.9 percentile as shown in Figure 27. With higher PD, we have more chances
that one asset default in the rst period and the replaced asset also default in the
second period.
Both Figure 26 and Figure 27 clearly show that the tail distributions in the
presence of liquidity horizon and portfolio rebalancing are dierent from standard
one-period models such as ASRF. It also shows that depending on the credit quality
of the portfolio, standard ASRF can both be conservative and aggressive.
The two-period conditional VaR at dierent percentiles are shown in both Figure
26 and Figure 27. We can see that our analytical solution does capture the impact
of liquidity horizon and portfolio rebalancing. It does provide a sensible comparable
measure to the MC simulation.
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III.2.2 Concentration Risk captured in the two-period conditional VaR
model
The conditional VaR model is further assessed to see how good it is in capturing
concentration risk in the presence of portfolio rebalancing. In our assessment, we
designed two cases. In the rst case, we create a portfolio of 50 assets with non-
uniform PDs with the results shown in Table 28. Table 29 shows the case with
non-uniform notional of the asset in the portfolio by change the weight of the one
asset. We can see that in both cases the conditional VaR model behave reasonably
better and closer to the MC results. More results with dierent notional weights
are plotted in Figure 28. We can clearly see that it is necessary to do granularity
adjustment to capture concentration risk and a two-period one does a better job
than the standard one.
III.3 Discussion
This chapter provides a general two-period conditional VaR model for the credit
portfolio that accounts for liquidity horizon and portfolio rebalance, as proposed
in the IRC model for Basel 2.5. The portfolio is re-balanced at the end of the
rst period so that constant level of risk can be maintained. The Prot and Loss
(P&L) and VaR contribution from the second period is conditional on the portfo-
lio re-balance assumptions, in which for the credit portfolio is rating based. The
methodology is an extension of GA model.
We have examined the numerical behavior of the model by benchmarking against
one period MC model, two-period MC with and without portfolio rebalancing,
standard ASRF, and standard (one-period) GA. Our major conclusions can be
summarized as follows:
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 As expected, when compared to two-period MC with portfolio rebalancing,
our analytical model has a very similar behavior to the standard GA in cap-
turing concentration risk of the credit portfolio.
 More importantly, the two-period conditional VaR model does captures the
impact of liquidity horizon and portfolio rebalancing as conrmed by MC.
The method can achieve a comparable measure for the standard MC based
IRC/IDR model with much higher computational eciency.
 It is shown that the standard one-period ASRF (with and without standard
GA) is not enough to achieve a comparable risk measure when the liquidity
horizon and portfolio rebalancing. The tail distribution with and without
portfolio rebalancing are very dierent due to two competing factors. One
is that the default correlation and its relationship between asset correlations
are dierent for dierent time windows. The other factor is the portfolio
rebalancing that allows multiple defaults. This addresses the fact that the
defaulted asset will be replaced with another asset which can default again.
We believe that this is an important feature for trading book that should be
included in the capital calculation.
 Depending on the credit quality of portfolio and percentile, the ASRF will
always be aggressive at the 100 percentile but can be both conservative and
aggressive for other percentiles in the presence of portfolio rebalancing within
the modeled time horizon. This means if we intend to come up with some an-
alytical benchmark measure, we do need to factor in the portfolio rebalancing
assumption as shown by our analysis.
In this dissertation we only considered one factor case, which can be expanded to
a multi-factor as proposed by Pykhtin [34]. In the actual credit portfolio, dierent
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trades are assigned dierent liquidity horizons, which can be modeled in the current
approach readily. For example, the longer liquidity horizon can be modeled by
assuming no portfolio rebalancing at the end of the rst period. Although rating is
taken as the constant level of risk measure, we do not consider the rating migration
P&L. Extending the current approach to include rating P&L is straightforward but
the analytical solution for it is too complicated. In practice, rating migration to
junk is the largest component in the rating migration P&L. We can treat migration
to junk as default and merger the default probabilities. Also it may be worth to
mention that in the latest Basel trading book fundamental review [2], IRC will be
replaced with IDR, which is only default risk driven.
The model can also be extended to other types of risk factor by modeling the
portfolio rebalancing assumption via some discretized values like rating ranks. The
portfolio rebalancing assumption can be either exposure based like the case for
credit portfolio discussed in this dissertation, or risk based, is dened as the sensi-
tivity to the risk factors. In our opinion, this direction of research is important to
address the liquidity modeling, and this was discussed in trading book fundamental
review [2].
III.4 Innite-period Analytic VaR Model
One remaining question regarding the two-period VaR model is what is the best
liquidity horizon we should use. The answer is unknown to everyone. However, from
our analysis, the analytic VaR can be achieved easily through central limit theorem.
Although the VaR of innite-period model is not practical and we can hardly nd its
nancial application, we can use it as the boundary of these VaR based on dierent
liquidity horizons. This result can at least tell us how the liquidity horizon can
aect the VaR. So this test result can be very valuable for future research when the
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optimum liquidity horizon is concerned.
This innite-period VaR calculation will be discussed in Appendix D and the
formula for q-percentile VaR under innite-period model is given in (D-29).
To compare this model with one-period and two-period default model, the nu-
merical results of three models given the same parameters are showed in Table 30.
The results are dierentiated by various number of assets and default probability
of the whole period. There is a valuable observation that the 99.9% VaR decreases
to a much lower amount while the number of periods goes to innity. The result
suggests that in practice, it will be a very challenging topic to choose the proper
liquidity horizon in the default model since the liquidity horizon can have huge
impact on the VaR.
III.5 Chapter Conclusion
In this chapter, we provided a general framework of two-period conditional VaR
model in the context of IRC modeling framework in which the liquidity horizon and
constant level of risk are considered. In this dissertation, we successfully found an
analytic approach to the two-period conditional VaR calculation by borrowing the
GA technique. Considering all current IRC calculations rely on time consuming
MC, and the banks still use more ecient but less practical ASRF (and its GA) as
important measures for the eective capital management for banks. Our research
is signicant progress of expanding current IRC research on liquidity risk. Our
research may have impact on the industry and improve their risk management
level.
One concerning we have on the multi-period capital model is there is no optimum
length liquidity horizon in any existing models. How does the liquidity horizon aect
the VaR was unknown and the topic worth further research. So in this dissertation,
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we presented an exact analytic solution of innite-period VaR which allows the
liquidity horizon goes to zero. By comparing the innite-period VaR result with
two-period VaR result, we can clearly see the length of liquidity horizon matters.
Although most IRC models are based on a nite period model, the exact innite-
period VaR calculation gives the boundary of VaR when liquidity horizon goes to
0. Our innite-period analysis provides a great insight for the future research and
regulations on how to choose the liquidity horizon properly.
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IV Conclusion
In this dissertation, we have elaborated the multiple default models in two
important credit risk issues Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA) and Incremental
Risk Charge (IRC), which received more and more attention after the 2008 nancial
crisis. The problem for each bank is the regulators kept changing their requirements
constantly because there is not any widespread market standard acceptance. So
the banks normally faced large pressures to fulll these new regulations. From
academic perspective, it is very valuable to investigate these signicant concepts of
credit risk for future reference.
First we focused on using PDEs on Credit Contingent Interest Rate Swap
(CCIRS) pricing, a specic CVA pricing problem. Our research not only provided a
successful multi-period PDEs solution in a multi-period model, it may also have an
important impact on current CVA research framework. The previous research on
CVA have not assessed the risk brought by the second and the subsequent defaults.
By extending the pricing model to a two-default model and then a full model where
we have no restriction on the number of defaults, we have successfully applied and
numerically solved much more complicated two-dimensional PDEs. Because of the
accuracy of PDE compared to the unstable Monte Carlo simulation, we have ap-
proached a thorough risk analysis using the results solved by PDE. This research
suggests that the CVA of subsequent multiple defaults cannot be ignored.
Second, we focused on the second issue IRC, a new capital charge announced
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by BCBS. Our research is large progress of expanding current IRC research on
liquidity risk and may also provide a guideline for future research on multi-period
model. As introduced in this dissertation, IRC is essentially the credit VaR with
liquidity horizon and constant level of risk, for which a new multi-period default
model is required. The multi-period VaR can easily be calculated by Monte Carlo
simulation but its accuracy and eciency has always been criticized in the real
business. We successfully found an analytic approach to the two-period conditional
VaR calculation by borrowing the GA technique. The order of error term has been
calculated as well and this provided an assessment of the accuracy of our analytic
method. We also achieved a nancially meaningful risk analysis by comparing the
one, two-period ASRF term and VaR numbers. This analysis is very valuable on
explaining the nancial meanings and dierence between one-period and two-period
model. In the end, to test how the liquidity horizon aects VaR, we presented an
accurate analytic solution for an innite-period default model, which provided the
boundary value of VaR by choosing dierent liquidity horizons. By comparing the
VaR in one-period, two-period and innite-period model, we complete our research
and provide a valuable insight on how the liquidity horizon will aect VaR.
One thing we should mention is, in the multi-period model, systematic factors
in each period are assumed to be independent. In the future research, we may
expand our analytical approach by considering the dependence of the systematic
factors in each period.
Compared to the current one-period CVA and numerical IRC calculation re-
search, our research not only opened the door to a dierent dimensional research
on these two important concepts but also provided guidelines for other potential
multi-period credit risk research.
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Table 1: 12 Month LIBOR Rate and CDS spread of dif-
ferent ratings (from May 1st, 2009 to April 30, 2014)
LIBOR
Date 12 Month
20140430 0.5490%
20140429 0.5490%
20140428 0.5495%
20140425 0.5495%
20140424 0.5495%
20140423 0.5483%
. . . . . .
20090507 1.7813%
20090506 1.8200%
20090505 1.8589%
20090504 1.8644%
20090501 1.8644%
variance 0.0007%
mean 0.909%
CDS Spread
Date AAA AA A BBB BB B
20140430 0.0938% 0.1670% 0.3881% 0.5722% 1.7952% 4.1154%
20140429 0.1105% 0.1679% 0.3985% 0.5913% 1.7995% 4.1502%
20140428 0.1113% 0.1685% 0.3992% 0.5894% 1.9206% 4.2556%
20140425 0.1113% 0.1673% 0.3826% 0.5697% 1.8139% 4.2349%
20140424 0.0968% 0.1676% 0.3807% 0.5806% 1.5016% 4.2173%
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20140423 0.1111% 0.1686% 0.4037% 0.5774% 1.7221% 4.3761%
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
20090507 0.3075% 0.9621% 1.6332% 3.4747% 8.4460% 28.0827%
20090506 0.3599% 1.1833% 1.8355% 3.6819% 8.8693% 26.2862%
20090505 0.3695% 1.1359% 1.8929% 3.8222% 9.1412% 26.5660%
20090504 0.4343% 1.2053% 2.0017% 3.8649% 9.3918% 26.4036%
20090501 0.4366% 1.1579% 2.0539% 3.9778% 8.8810% 26.9790%
variance 0.0001% 0.0005% 0.0007% 0.0032% 0.0168% 0.2053%
mean 0.2476% 0.5264% 0.7041% 1.0387% 2.7020% 7.4352%
Table 2: Interest Rate Model Parameters estimations
r0 b1 1 a1
0.5490% 0.909% 0.038060013 1
Table 3: Hazard Rate Model Parameters estimations
0 b2 2 a2
AAA 0.15633% 0.4127% 0.020113992 1
AA 0.27833% 0.8774% 0.032584086 1
A 0.64683% 1.1736% 0.035502957 1
BBB 0.95367% 1.7312% 0.060824805 1
BB 2.99200% 4.5034% 0.086378396 1
B 6.85900% 12.3920% 0.182026115 1
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Table 4: Comparison of results obtained using PDE and
Monte-Carlo methods for one default case (maturity=5,
K=0.00909, 1 million simulation paths).
PDE(ADI) PDE(ADI) Monte Carlo
time steps 600 time steps 2000
Price $ 2,236.22 $ 2,235.02 $ 2,204.58
Time (seconds) 1.19 3.62 648
Table 5: Comparison of results using PDEs and Monte-
Carlo methods for the two default case. (maturity=5,
K=0.00909, 1 million simulation paths)
PDE PDE MC
timestep 600 timestep 2000 timestep 2000
Price $ 2,264.26 $ 2,263.50 $ 2,223.51
Time (seconds) 4.07 14.68 660
Table 6: Price of CCIRS on dierent annual node (ma-
turity=5, K=0.00909)
Year r(t) (t) Price
0 0.5490% 0.6468% 2,264.26
1 0.5301% 0.5383% 1,293.70
2 0.6261% 0.6664% 705.00
3 0.7932% 1.0683% 401.82
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4 0.9933% 0.8382% 146.92
Table 7: Comparison of the one-default, two-default and
full prices (timestep=2000, maturity=5, K=0.00909).
one-default two-default full
Price $ 2,235.02 $ 2,263.50 $ 2,263.51
Table 8: Comparison of the one-default, two-default and
full prices w.r.t dierent correlation (timestep=600, ma-
turity=5, K=0.01).
 one-default two-default full
0 2,075 2,100 2,100
0.1 2,155 2,182 2,181
0.2 2,236 2,264 2,264
0.3 2,319 2,349 2,348
0.4 2,404 2,435 2,434
0.5 2,490 2,522 2,522
0.6 2,578 2,611 2,611
0.7 2,668 2,702 2,702
0.8 2,759 2,794 2,794
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Table 9: Comparison of the one-default, two-default and
full prices of dierent ratings.(maturity=10, K=0.01
Rating one-default two-default innity-default
AAA 303.76 310.24 310.29
AA 632.60 661.51 662.15
A 822.47 875.13 876.85
BBB 1,215.01 1,330.24 1,336.12
BB 2,548.34 3,185.29 3,279.92
B 4,224.85 6,964.76 8,283.93
Table 10: CCIRS price with dierent reverting speed of
hazard rate (rating A)
a2 one-default two-default full
0.50 840 891 892
0.70 835 887 888
0.90 827 879 881
1.10 819 871 873
1.30 812 865 866
1.50 806 859 860
Table 11: CCIRS price with dierent reverting speed of
hazard rate (rating B)
a2 one-default two-default full
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0.50 4,479 7,134 8,382
0.70 4,372 7,092 8,381
0.90 4,270 7,008 8,320
1.10 4,184 6,923 8,248
1.30 4,114 6,846 8,178
1.50 4,056 6,779 8,114
Table 12: CCIRS price with dierent volatility of hazard
rate(rating A)
2 one-default two-default full
0.02 786 836 838
0.04 833 886 888
0.06 880 937 939
0.08 927 987 989
0.10 972 1,035 1,037
Table 13: CCIRS price with dierent volatility of hazard
rate(rating B)
2 one-default two-default full
0.10 3,973 6,573 7,803
0.20 4,278 7,045 8,384
0.30 4,559 7,445 8,894
0.40 4,801 7,754 9,304
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Table 14: CCIRS price under dierent assumptions
(a1=0.1, rating A)
b1 one-default two-default full
0.60% 28,958 29,021 29,017
0.80% 57,022 57,006 56,998
1.00% 89,027 88,930 88,918
1.20% 122,530 122,365 122,348
1.40% 156,397 156,174 156,153
1.60% 190,142 189,868 189,842
1.80% 223,568 223,246 223,216
2.00% 256,595 256,228 256,194
Table 15: CCIRS price under dierent assumptions
(a1=0.1, rating B)
b1 one-default two-default full
0.60% 279,104 285,694 285,625
0.80% 516,726 519,715 518,818
1.00% 805,868 804,440 802,527
1.20% 1,107,340 1,102,014 1,099,080
1.40% 1,411,499 1,403,424 1,399,581
1.60% 1,716,088 1,705,702 1,701,004
1.80% 2,015,771 2,003,456 1,997,976
2.00% 2,313,791 2,299,663 2,293,428
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Table 16: CCIRS price under dierent assumptions
(a1=0.5, rating A)
b1 one-default two-default full
0.60% 18,422 18,425 18,422
0.80% 50,912 50,820 50,812
1.00% 86,042 85,888 85,876
1.20% 121,013 120,808 120,792
1.40% 155,553 155,300 155,278
1.60% 189,630 189,329 189,304
1.80% 223,240 222,894 222,864
2.00% 256,388 255,998 255,963
Table 17: CCIRS price under dierent assumptions
(a1=0.5, rating B)
b1 one-default two-default full
0.60% 165,118 167,209 167,047
0.80% 458,605 453,699 452,074
1.00% 775,979 768,176 765,469
1.20% 1,091,566 1,081,910 1,078,361
1.40% 1,401,960 1,390,520 1,386,187
1.60% 1,708,185 1,694,906 1,689,799
1.80% 2,009,844 1,994,755 1,988,890
2.00% 2,307,735 2,290,852 2,284,243
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Table 18: CCIRS price under dierent assumptions
(a1=1, rating A)
b1 one-default two-default full
0.60% 15,213 15,181 15,179
0.80% 50,162 50,053 50,045
1.00% 85,571 85,408 85,396
1.20% 120,579 120,365 120,348
1.40% 155,124 154,862 154,841
1.60% 189,201 188,892 188,866
1.80% 222,813 222,457 222,426
2.00% 255,963 255,562 255,527
Table 19: CCIRS price under dierent assumptions
(a1=1, rating B)
b1 one-default two-default full
0.60% 135,630 133,882 133,425
0.80% 452,671 445,975 444,031
1.00% 771,919 763,247 760,422
1.20% 1,086,414 1,075,819 1,072,185
1.40% 1,396,353 1,383,793 1,379,356
1.60% 1,702,193 1,687,699 1,682,474
1.80% 2,003,896 1,987,535 1,981,546
2.00% 2,301,607 2,283,420 2,276,685
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Table 20: CCIRS price under dierent assumptions
(a1=1.5, rating A)
b1 one-default two-default full
0.60% 14,493 14,448 14,446
0.80% 49,923 49,809 49,801
1.00% 85,355 85,188 85,176
1.20% 120,360 120,143 120,126
1.40% 154,898 154,633 154,612
1.60% 188,969 188,656 188,630
1.80% 222,575 222,215 222,185
2.00% 255,720 255,316 255,281
Table 21: CCIRS price under dierent assumptions
(a1=1.5, rating B)
b1 one-default two-default full
0.60% 130,105 126,869 126,201
0.80% 450,915 443,942 441,951
1.00% 769,497 760,500 757,658
1.20% 1,083,581 1,072,560 1,068,895
1.40% 1,393,396 1,380,371 1,375,897
1.60% 1,699,130 1,684,159 1,678,898
1.80% 2,000,768 1,983,913 1,977,888
2.00% 2,298,370 2,279,668 2,272,898
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Table 22: CCIRS price with dierent volatility of interest
rate (rating A)
1 one-default two-default full
0.02 25 27 27
0.04 997 1,060 1,061
0.06 3,797 3,984 3,988
0.08 7,974 8,308 8,316
0.10 12,921 13,405 13,415
Table 23: CCIRS price with dierent volatility of interest
rate (rating B)
1 one-default two-default full
0.02 112 218 290
0.04 5,181 8,438 9,973
0.06 21,458 31,854 36,061
0.08 47,282 66,491 73,668
0.10 78,937 107,272 117,388
Table 24: CCIRS price with dierent Maturity (rating
A)
Maturity one-default two-default full
5 560 572 572
7 765 792 793
87
9 824 869 870
11 821 883 885
13 805 884 888
15 751 841 847
Table 25: CCIRS price with dierent Maturity (rating
B)
Maturity one-default two-default full
5 4,511 5,506 5,637
7 5,219 7,141 7,621
9 4,667 7,235 8,259
11 3,797 6,677 8,355
13 2,999 5,965 8,378
15 2,268 5,016 7,953
Table 26: the Comparison of ASRF VaR, 1-period GA
VaR, 2-period Conditional VaR and 2-period MC VaR
with Dierent  (N=100, PD=1%, LGD=1)
ASRF 1-period GA 1-period MC 2-period Cond. 2-period MC
 VaR VaR VaR VaR VaR
0.1 3.96% 10.72% 8.00% 11.76% 8.00%
0.2 7.11% 10.72% 10.00% 10.14% 9.00%
0.3 11.84% 14.35% 14.00% 12.32% 12.00%
0.4 18.56% 20.49% 20.60% 17.09% 17.00%
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0.5 27.77% 29.32% 29.00% 24.68% 24.10%
0.6 40.05% 41.31% 41.60% 35.76% 36.00%
0.7 55.97% 56.97% 57.00% 51.18% 50.70%
0.8 75.61% 76.35% 76.50% 71.64% 71.40%
0.9 95.20% 95.61% 95.60% 94.16% 94.30%
Table 27: the Comparison of ASRF VaR, 1-period GA
VaR, 2-period Conditional VaR and 2-period MC VaR
with Dierent Number of Assets N (=0.5, PD=1%,
LGD=1)
ASRF 1-period GA 1-period MC 2-period Cond. 2-period MC
N VaR VaR VaR VaR VaR
20 27.77% 35.53% 35.00% 31.49% 30.00%
40 27.77% 31.65% 32.50% 27.23% 27.53%
60 27.77% 30.36% 30.00% 25.82% 25.17%
80 27.77% 29.71% 31.25% 25.11% 25.25%
100 27.77% 29.32% 29.00% 24.68% 24.10%
200 27.77% 28.55% 28.50% 23.83% 23.95%
400 27.77% 28.16% 28.50% 23.41% 23.36%
500 27.77% 28.08% 27.80% 23.32% 23.50%
700 27.77% 27.99% 28.14% 23.23% 23.42%
1000 27.77% 27.92% 27.00% 23.15% 23.36%
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Table 28: the Comparison of ASRF VaR, 1-period
GA VaR, 2-period Conditional VaR and 2-period MC
VaR w.r.t Mixed Default Probabilities ( = 0:5, N=50,
LGD=1)
PD ASRF VaR 1-period GA VaR 2-period Cond. VaR MC VaR
mixed 31.17% 34.31% 31.70% 31.90%
5% 61.32% 64.70% 62.44% 62.47%
1% 27.77% 30.89% 26.38% 26.39%
0.10% 6.18% 8.60% 7.42% 7.80%
Table 29: the Comparison of ASRF VaR, 1-period GA
VaR, 2-period Conditional VaR and 2-period MC VaR
w.r.t Dierent Notional Weights of the rst asset(the
other assets are equally weighted, PD=1%, N=100,
=0.5, LGD=1)
weight ASRF VaR 1-period GA VaR 2-period Cond. VaR MC VaR
1% 27.77% 29.32% 24.68% 24.10%
11% 27.77% 30.89% 26.40% 26.28%
21% 27.77% 35.60% 31.55% 33.77%
31% 27.77% 43.44% 40.14% 42.85%
41% 27.77% 54.42% 52.17% 51.13%
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Table 30: the Comparison of One, Two and Innite Pe-
riods Analytic VaR w.r.t Dierent Default Probabilities
PD 1% 1% 1% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10%
Periods 1 2 1 1 2 1
N VaR VaR VaR VaR VaR VaR
20 35.53% 31.49% 11.81% 12.18% 11.22% 3.29%
40 31.65% 27.23% 8.94% 9.18% 8.05% 2.39%
60 30.36% 25.82% 7.67% 8.18% 7.00% 1.98%
80 29.71% 25.11% 6.91% 7.68% 6.47% 1.75%
100 29.32% 24.68% 6.39% 7.38% 6.15% 1.58%
200 28.55% 23.83% 5.11% 6.78% 5.52% 1.18%
400 28.16% 23.41% 4.20% 6.48% 5.20% 0.89%
500 28.08% 23.32% 3.97% 6.42% 5.14% 0.82%
700 27.99% 23.23% 3.67% 6.36% 5.07% 0.72%
1000 27.92% 23.15% 3.40% 6.30% 5.01% 0.64%
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Figure 1: CCIRS price as a function of interest and hazard rates.
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Figure 2: Dierence of the full price and two-default price
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Figure 3: Dierence of two-default and one-default price
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Figure 4: Price comparison with dierent initial and long term average hazard
rates
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Figure 5: Price comparison with dierent reverting speed of hazard rate (For rating
A)
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Figure 6: Price comparison with dierent reverting speed of hazard rate (For rating
B)
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Figure 7: Price comparison with dierent volatility of hazard rate (For rating A)
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Figure 8: Price comparison with dierent volatility of hazard rate (For rating B)
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Figure 9: Price comparison with dierent long term average interest rates when
a1=0.1 (For rating A)
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Figure 10: Price comparison with dierent long term average interest rates when
a1=0.1 (For rating B)
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Figure 11: Price comparison with dierent long term average interest rates when
a1=0.5 (For rating A)
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Figure 12: Price comparison with dierent long term average interest rates when
a1=0.5 (For rating B)
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Figure 13: Price comparison with dierent long term average interest rates when
a1=1 (For rating A)
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Figure 14: Price comparison with dierent long term average interest rates when
a1=1 (For rating B)
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Figure 15: Price comparison with dierent long term average interest rates when
a1=1.5 (For rating A)
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Figure 16: Price comparison with dierent long term average interest rates when
a1=1.5 (For rating B)
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Figure 17: Price comparison when interest rate gradually increases (For rating A).
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Figure 18: Price comparison when interest rate gradually increases (For rating B).
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Figure 19: Price comparison when interest rate gradually decreases (For rating A).
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Figure 20: Price comparison when interest rate gradually decreases (For rating B).
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Figure 21: Price comparison with dierent volatility of interest rate (For rating A)
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Figure 22: Price comparison with dierent volatility of interest rate (For rating B)
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Figure 23: Price comparison with dierent Maturity (For rating A)
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Figure 24: Price comparison with dierent Maturity (For rating B)
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Figure 25: The comparison of ratio of ASRF, One-period, two-period analytic VaR
to 2-period MC VaR w.r.t dierent N (20 to 1000) when =0.5, PD=1%
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Figure 26: One-period, two-period MC paths and two-period MC paths without
rebalancing when N=100, =0.5, PD=5%
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Figure 27: One-period and two-period MC paths value and 2-period Conditional
VaR, when PD=7%; N = 200;  = 0:5
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Figure 28: The comparison of ratio of ASRF, one-period, two-period analytic VaR
to two-period MC VaR w.r.t dierent weight of the rst asset (1% to 40%) when
N=100, =0.5, PD=0.1%
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A Convergence Analysis
The solutions obtained by numerical methods are usually not the exact solutions
of the problem. There are two types of errors: round-o errors and truncation
errors. Roundo errors came from the limitation of a nite-state machine which
cannot display the innite real numbers. Truncation errors are resulting from the
dierence of the approximate solution and the exact solution. Once an error is
generated, it will generally propagate through the calculation. So the convergence
test is a very important criterion to guarantee the numerical solution moves towards
the real solution. The solution of the discretized problem converges to the solution
of the continuous problem as the grid size goes to zero, and the speed of convergence
is one of the factors of the eciency of the method.
In this appendix, we will carry out a convergence investigation of one-default,
two-default and full model PDEs solutions. Many dierent experiments are per-
formed with dierent size of interest rate, hazard rate and time steps. Since the
analytic solution is not available in these experiments, we choose the results gained
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from the nest grid as our reference solution. Then we compute the absolute error
between the reference solution and the solution obtained on the coarser grid. The
convergence rate is the divisions of two corresponding absolute errors.
 Convergence test for the price under one and two defaults models.
To calculate the convergence rate, we perform eight experiments with varying
grids. In the grids, r and  steps are 45, 68, 101, 152, 228, 342. So the r and 
decrease by the ratio of 1.5. Then r and   0.00222, 0.00147, 0.00099, 0.00066,
0.00044, 0.00029 and 0.0001949. The maturity is 5 years and the time steps is set
to be 600 (so t is about 0.00833 ). The parameters are chosen from Table 2 and
Rating A row in Table 3. K = b1, M = 5 and  = 0:2.
Table 30 shows the convergence analysis for r and . From this table we see
that our numerical algorithm converges faster when the step sizes get smaller and
the convergence rate is around 1:52 = 2:25, which gives the order of our algorithm
is about two.
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Table 30: Convergence Test
Steps Value error
r  time one two full one two full
45 45 600 2,319 2,347 2,347 105.70 104.40 104.00
68 68 600 2,268 2,296 2,296 54.40 53.40 53.00
101 101 600 2,238 2,266 2,266 24.90 23.90 23.50
152 152 600 2,224 2,252 2,252 10.60 9.60 9.30
228 228 600 2,220 2,248 2,248 6.30 5.30 5.00
342 342 600 2,217 2,245 2,245 4.00 3.00 2.60
513 513 600 2,216 2,244 2,244 2.90 2.00 1.60
error percentage Convergence rate
r  time one two full one two full
45 45 600 4.7757% 4.6557% 4.6375%
68 68 600 2.4579% 2.3814% 2.3633% 1.94 1.96 1.96
101 101 600 1.1250% 1.0658% 1.0479% 2.18 2.23 2.26
152 152 600 0.4789% 0.4281% 0.4147% 2.35 2.49 2.53
228 228 600 0.2846% 0.2364% 0.2230% 1.68 1.81 1.86
342 342 600 0.1807% 0.1338% 0.1159% 1.58 1.77 1.92
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513 513 600 0.1310% 0.0892% 0.0713% 1.38 1.50 1.62
Reference Solution
r  time one two full
546 546 20000 2,213 2,242 2,243
 Remarks
From Table 30 we see that our algorithms converge to the exact solution when
the step sizes go to zero. This gives us condence that our numerical methods for
the PDE of PG and PS are convergent and trustable. Hence the numerical results
we have obtained in this dissertation are good.
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B Proposition Required for 2-Period Analytic
VaR solution
Proposition B.1 . Let X be dened as (III.1.14), S1; S2 are the same independent
systematic factors as previously dened. Function l(s) is dened as (III.1.15).
Function gs() is dened as (III.1.39). Interval 
(s) is dened as (III.1.40).
Assume X1; X2; :::Xn; S1; S1 are i.i.d and their common density function is f()
and common distribution function is F (). Then we could have:
E[h(X1; X2; :::Xn; S1; S2)jX = s]
=
Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
Z

(s)
h(x1; x2; :::; xn; y; gs(y))
 f(x1)f(x2):::f(xn)f(y)f(gs(y))@gt(y)
@t

t=s
dx1dx2:::dxndy
#

Z

(s)
f(y)f(gs(y))
@gt(y)
@t

t=s
dy
# 1
=
Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
Z

(s)
h(x1; x2; :::; xn; y; gs(y))
 f(x1)f(x2):::f(xn)f(y)f(gs(y))(l0(gs(y))) 1dx1dx2:::dxndy
#
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
Z

(s)
f(y)f(gs(y))(l
0(gs(y))) 1dy
 1
:
(B-1)
Proof First we know if X = s, then S2 = gs(S1). And
E[h(X1; X2; :::Xn; S1; S2)jX = s]
= E[h(X1; X2; :::Xn; S1; gs(S1))jX = s]
=
Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
h(x1; x2; :::; xn; y; gs(y))
 fX1;X2;:::;Xn;S1jX(x1; x2; :::; xn; yjs)dx1dx2:::dxndy ;
(B-2)
where fX1;X2;:::;Xn;S1jX(x1; x2; :::; xn; yjx) is the conditional density function and it
satises:
fX1;X2;:::;Xn;S1jX(x1; x2; :::; xn; yjx) =
f(x1; x2; :::; xn; y; x)
fX(x)
: (B-3)
Here f(x1; x2; :::; xn; y; x) is the joint density function of X1; X2; :::; Xn; S1 and X.
fX(x) is the marginal density function of X and it is already derived in equation
(III.1.41).
Now let's get
f(x1; x2; :::; xn; y; x) =
@F (x1; x2; :::; xn; y; x)
@x1@x2:::@xn@y@x
: (B-4)
F (x1; x2; :::; xn; y; x)P (X1  x1; X2  x2; :::; Xn  xn; S1  y;X  x)
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(X1; X2; :::Xn; S1; S2 are independent)
P (X1  x1)P (X2  x2):::P (Xn  xn)P (S1  y;X  x)
F (x1)F (x2):::F (xn)P (S1  y;X  x) :
(B-5)
Now as always, we need to discuss in two cases:
case 1: x >
PN
i=1(ui);
case 2: 0 < x PNi=1(ui).
In case 1, let ~s(x) = l 1(x PNi=1(ui)).
So, if y  ~s(x), X will be always less than x,
P (S1  y;X  x) = P (S1  y) = F (y) ; (B-6)
if y > ~s(x),
P (S1  y;X  x)
= P (X  x; S1  y; S2  ~s(x)) + P (X  x; S1  ~s(x); S2 > ~s(x))
+ P (X  x; ~s(x) < S1  y; S2 > ~s(x))
= F (~s(x))F (y) + F (~s(x))(1  F (~s(x))) + P (~s(x) < S1  y; ~s(x) < S2  gx(S1))
= (1  F (~s(x)) + F (y))F (~s(x)) +
Z y
~s(x)
f(s1)[F (gx(s1))  F (~s(x))]ds1 : (B-7)
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From (B-6) and (B-7) we can get the joint density function as:
f(x1; x2; :::; xn; y; x)
= f(x1)f(x2):::f(xn)


f(y)f(~s(x))~s0(x) + f(y)f(gx(y))
@gt(y)
@t

t=x
  f(y)f(~s(x))~s0(x)

I(y > ~s(x))
= f(x1)f(x2):::f(xn)f(y)f(gx(y))
@gt(y)
@t

t=x
I(y > ~s(x))
= f(x1)f(x2):::f(xn)f(y)f(gx(y))(l
0(gx(y))) 1I(y > ~s(x)) : (B-8)
So from (III.1.41) and (B-8), we have
E[h(X1; X2; :::Xn; S1; S2)jX = s]
=
Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
h(x1; x2; :::; xn; y; gs(y))
f(x1; x2; :::; xn; y; s)
fX(s)
dx1dx2:::dxndy
=
Z

(s)
f(y)f(gs(y))(l
0(gs(y))) 1dy
 1 "Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
h(x1; x2; :::; xn; y; gs(y))
 f(x1)f(x2):::f(xn)f(y)f(gs(y))(l0(gs(y))) 1I(y > ~s(s))dx1dx2:::dxndy
#
=
Z

(s)
f(y)f(gs(y))(l
0(gs(y))) 1dy
 1 "Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
Z

(s)
h(x1; x2; :::; xn; y; gs(y))
 f(x1)f(x2):::f(xn)f(y)f(gs(y))(l0(gs(y))) 1dx1dx2:::dxndy
#
: (B-9)
This result is the same as the result in (B-1).
Now let us prove (B-1) still holds in case 2.
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If y  l 1(x), we have:
P (S1  y;X  x)
= P (X  x; S1 < l 1(x)) + P (X  x; y  S1  l 1(x))
= P (S1 < l
 1(x); S2 < gx(S1)) + 0
=
Z l 1(x)
 1
f(s1)F (gx(S1))ds1 : (B-10)
If y < l 1(x), we have:
P (S1  y;X  x)
= P (S1  y; S2 < gx(S1))
=
Z y
 1
f(s1)F (gx(S1))ds1 : (B-11)
From (B-10) and (B-11) we can get the joint density function as:
f(x1; x2; :::; xn; y; x)
= f(x1)f(x2):::f(xn)

f(y)f(gx(y))
@gt(y)
@t

t=x

I(y < l 1(x))
= f(x1)f(x2):::f(xn)f(y)f(gx(y))(l
0(gx(y))) 1I(y < l 1(x)) : (B-12)
So from (III.1.41) and (B-12), we have
E[h(X1; X2; :::Xn; S1; S2)jX = s]
=
Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
h(x1; x2; :::; xn; y; gs(y))
f(x1; x2; :::; xn; y; s)
fX(s)
dx1dx2:::dxndy
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=Z

(s)
f(y)f(gs(y))(l
0(gs(y))) 1dy
 1 "Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
h(x1; x2; :::; xn; y; gs(y))
 f(x1)f(x2):::f(xn)f(y)f(gs(y))(l0(gs(y))) 1I(y < l 1(x))dx1dx2:::dxndy
#
=
Z

(s)
f(y)f(gs(y))(l
0(gs(y))) 1dy
 1 "Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
Z

(s)
h(x1; x2; :::; xn; y; gs(y))
 f(x1)f(x2):::f(xn)f(y)f(gs(y))(l0(gs(y))) 1dx1dx2:::dxndy
#
: (B-13)
This result is the same as the result in (B-1).
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C Order of 2-Period Analytic VaR Adjustment
The two-period conditional VaR is based on the value of the second derivative
in Taylor expansion (III.1.12). This appendix provides the order of error term in
this approximation and the higher order derivative, i.e. the order of each derivative
of VaR of a ne-grained portfolio. The full Taylor expansion is
q(LN) = q(X) +
+1X
m=1
@m
@"m
q(X + "Y )

"=0
:
Without loss of generality, simply assume
P
ui = 1. Since the portfolio is ne-
grained, it is reasonable to assume that
9C > 0; for all N; s:t: max(ui)  C
N
: (C-1)
A special case of ne-grained portfolio is the homogenous portfolio, in which
the trades have the same default probability, the same exposure and the same
correlations, so each ui =
1
N
.
To proceed, a few new notations and a proposition will be presented.
For any integer m, if p is a partition of m, denote by p  m, then p can be
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indicated by
p = 1ep1 ; 2ep2 ; :::;mepm ; (C-2)
where ei is the frequency of the number i in the partition and then
m = ep1 + 2ep2 + :::+mepm : (C-3)
The number of summands of p is expressed by jpj, which is the sum
jpj = ep1 + ep2 + :::+ epm : (C-4)
The notation p^ indicates the partition when each summand of a partition p is
increased by 1, i.e.
p^ = 1ep1+1; 2ep2+1; :::;mepm+1 : (C-5)
Proposition C.1 Denote
p =
m!Qm
i=1[(i!)
epiepi!]
: (C-6)
Then the mth order derivative of VaR is
@mq(X + "Y )
@"m

"=0
=( 1)m
( X
pm;usjpj 1
"
pu^(jpj+ juj   1)!
(s+ juj)!(jpj   1  s)!  ( fX(x))
 jpj juj

 
sY
i=1

difX(x)
dxi
eui!
 d
jpj 1 s
dxjpj 1 s
 
mY
i=1

di 1(E(Y ijX = x)fX(x))
dxi 1
epi!#)
x=q(X)
:
(C-7)
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Proof See section 4.5.6.2.4 in Hibbeln, 2010 [27].
Now Proposition C.1 can be used to get the order of each derivative with respect
to N when m  2 (note the rst derivative is 0).
In equation (C-7), the number of trades N is independent of this part
pu^(jpj+ juj   1)!
(s+ juj)!(jpj   1  s)!  ( fX(x))
 jpj juj 
 
sY
i=1

difX(x)
dxi
eui!
x=q(X)
: (C-8)
So the mth order derivative of VaR can be written as a simplied form
@mq(X + "Y )
@"m

"=0
= g
 X
pm
mY
i=1
[i(Y jX = x)]epi
!
x=q(X)
; (C-9)
where g is a function that is independent of N and i is the ith moment about the
origin. Denote i is the ith moment about the mean. Remember X = E(LN jS1; S2)
and Y = LN   E(LN jS1; S2), so it is possible to rewrite
X
pm
mY
i=1
[i(Y jX = x)]epi

x=q(X)
=
X
pm
mY
i=1
[E[(LN   E(LN jS1; S2))ijX = x]]epi

x=q(X)
(Since (X) = (E(LN jS1; S2))  (S1; S2); by tower property)
=
X
pm
mY
i=1
[E[E[(LN   E(LN jS1; S2))ijS1; S2]jX = x]]epi

x=q(X)
=
X
pm
mY
i=1
[E[i(LN jS1; S2)jX = x]]epi

x=q(X)
: (C-10)
Now lets nd the order of i(LN jS1; S2) with respect to the number of trades
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N . Since the i is additive to independent random variables only when i  3 and
1  0, two situations will be discussed here.
In the rst case, i = 2 or 3. Then
i(LN jS1; S2) = i
 
NX
j=1
h
ujIfT (j)1 >Ujg
+ ujIfT (j)2 >Ujg
i S1; S2
!
: (C-11)
Conditioning on (S1; S2), all IfT (j)1 >Ujg
and IfT (j)2 >Ujg
are independent, so equation
(C-11) can be simplied as
i(LN jS1; S2) = i
 
NX
j=1
h
ujIfT (j)1 >Ujg
+ ujIfT (j)2 >Ujg
i S1; S2
!
=
NX
j=1
(uj)
i

i

IfT (j)1 >Ujg
S1; S2+ iIfT (j)2 >Ujg
S1; S2 :
(C-12)
For any S1 and S2, it is obvious
iIfT (j)1 >Ujg
S1; S2 < 1, so
ji(LN jS1; S2)j  2
NX
j=1
(uj)
i
(by assumption (C   1))
 2N 

C
N
i
= O

1
N i 1

: (C-13)
In the second case, i > 3. Then
i(LN jS1; S2) =
X
pi;ep1=0
ap
iY
j=2
(j(LN jS1; S2))epj ;
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where j is the cumulants and ap is the coecient which can be found through
the Faa di Bruno's formula. One proposition is required here to get the order of
i(LN jS1; S2) with respect to N .
Proposition C.2
ji(LN jS1; S2)j  O

1
N i 1

: (C-14)
Proof i is additive to the independent random variables. So
i(LN jS1; S2) = i
 
NX
j=1
h
ujIfT (j)1 >Ujg
+ ujIfT (j)2 >Ujg
i S1; S2
!
=
NX
j=1
(uj)
i

i

IfT (j)1 >Ujg
S1; S2+ iIfT (j)2 >Ujg
S1; S2 :
(C-15)
Because
iIfT (j)1 >Ujg
S1; S2 =
X
pi
b(1)p
iY
j=1

j

IfT (j)1 >Ujg
S1; S2epj


X
pi
jb(1)p j (C-16)
and similarly,
iIfT (j)2 >Ujg
S1; S2 X
pi
jb(2)p j ; (C-17)
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then
ji(LN jS1; S2)j 
NX
j=1
(uj)
i
 X
pi
jb(1)p j+
X
pi
jb(2)p j
!
(by assumption (C   1))

 X
pi
jb(1)p j+
X
pi
jb(2)p j
!
N 

C
N
i
= O

1
N i 1

: (C-18)
This ends the proof.
With Proposition C.2,
ji(LN jS1; S2)j =

X
pi;ep1=0
ap
iY
j=2
(j(LN jS1; S2))epj


X
pi; ep1=0
japjO

1
N i jpj

= O

1
N i jpj
 
pi; ep1=0
(Since i > 3; then i  jpj  2)
= O

1
N2

(C-19)
Now combine the conclusions in (C-13) and (C-19), and apply them on (C-10).
If m = 2, X
pm
mY
i=1
[i(Y jX = x)]epi

x=q(X)
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= E[2(LN jS1; S2)jX = x]jx=q(X)
O

1
N

: (C-20)
If m  3, X
pm
mY
i=1
[i(Y jX = x)]epi

x=q(X)

=
X
pm
mY
i=1
[E[i(LN jS1; S2)jX = x]]epi

x=q(X)


X
pm
O

1
N2jpj

=O

1
N2jpj
 
pm
(Since jpj  1)
O

1
N2

(C-21)
So it is proved that the order of the second derivative is at least O
 
1
N

, and the
order of higher derivative is at least O
 
1
N2

.
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D Innite-Period Analytic VaR
D.1 General M-period Model
Similar to the two-period default model (III.1.9), theM -period model is dened
L
(M)
N =
MX
j=1
"
NX
i=1
uiIfT (j)i >Uig
#
; (D-1)
where
T
(j)
i = iSj +
q
1  2i (j)i ; (D-2)
ui is the loss given default of asset i, all the 
(j)
i are the idiosyncratic factors which
are independent across each other and across each systematic factor Sj, and i is
the positive correlation between asset factor T
(j)
i and systematic factor Si. Note
i is the same in each jth period since the trade has the same behavior over the
systematic factor in any time before the maturity. Ui is the threshold to determine
if the default of the ith trade will happen. The default level is assumed to be con-
stant, so Ui is the same in each jth period. Again, all Sj and 
(j)
i are i.i.d. standard
normal random variables.
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D.2 Analytic VaR by Central Limit Theorem
Denote
Xj =
NX
i=1
uiIfT (j)i >Uig
: (D-3)
Then
L
(M)
N =
MX
j=1
Xj : (D-4)
It is easy to nd out all Xj are i.i.d.. By central limit theorem,
p
M(L
(M)
N =M   )

d ! N(0; 1); when M !1 ; (D-5)
where  = E(Xj) and 
2 = 2(Xj). This means
L
(M)
N
d ! N(M; 2M); when M !1 : (D-6)
So when M is large enough, the VaR of this portfolio, q(L
(M)
N ) can be approx-
imated as
q(L
(M)
N )  M +
p
M2 1(q) : (D-7)
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D.3 Expectation and Variance of Xj
Now it is necessary to nd the expectation and variance of Xj.
 = E(Xj)
=
NX
i=1
uiE

IfT (j)i >Uig

=
NX
i=1
uiP (T
(j)
i > Ui)
=
NX
i=1
uiPD
(j)
i ; (D-8)
where PD
(j)
i is the default probability of the ith trade in the jth period. In the
multi-period model, default probability is assumed to be on a constant level. And
PDi, the default probability of the ith trade within the whole period is given. By
the property of survival probability
MY
k=1
P (the ith trade survives in the kth period)
= P (the ith trade survives in all periods) (D-9)
i.e.
MY
k=1
(1  PD(k)i ) = (1  PD(j)i )M = 1  PDi : (D-10)
Then
PD
(j)
i = 1  (1  PDi)
1
M : (D-11)
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So we have
 =
NX
i=1
ui[1  (1  PDi) 1M ] : (D-12)
The variance is a little more complicated.
2 = E(X2j )  (E(Xj))2 : (D-13)
E(Xj) is given by (D-8), and E(X
2
j ) can be calculated as
E(X2j ) =
NX
i=1
u2iE

I2fT (j)i >Uig

+
NX
i;k=1(i6=k)
uiukE

IfT (j)i >Uig
IfT (j)k >Ukg

=
NX
i=1
u2iE

IfT (j)i >Uig

+
NX
i;k=1(i6=k)
uiukE

IfT (j)i >Uig
IfT (j)k >Ukg

; (D-14)
where E

IfT (j)i >Uig
IfT (j)k >Ukg

is
E

IfT (j)i >Uig
IfT (j)k >Ukg

= P ((T
(j)
i > Ui) \ (T (j)k > Uk))
= P (T
(j)
i > UijT (j)k > Uk)P (T (j)k > Uk)
=
Z 1
 1
(s)
"
1  
 
Ui   isp
1  2i
!#"
1  
 
Uk   ksp
1  2k
!#
ds  PD(j)k
=
Z 1
 1
(s)PD
(j)
i (s)PD
(j)
k (s)dsPD
(j)
k : (D-15)
PD
(j)
i (s) is the default probability of the ith trade in the jth period given the
systematic factor is equal to s. Again, by the property of survival probability, we
126
have
(1  PD(j)i (s))M = 1  P (the ith trade is defaultjS1 = s; S2 = s; :::; SM = s) :
(D-16)
Assume
gPDi(s) = P (the ith trade is defaultjS1 = s; S2 = s; :::; SM = s) ; (D-17)
then
PD
(j)
i (s) = 1  (1 gPDi(s)) 1M : (D-18)
So
E

IfT (j)i >Uig
IfT (j)k >Ukg

=Z 1
 1
(s)[1  (1 gPDi(s)) 1M ][1  (1 gPDk(s)) 1M ]dsPD(j)k : (D-19)
Finally, the formula of variance is derived
2 =
NX
i=1
u2i [1  (1  PDi)
1
M ]
+
NX
i;k=1(i6=k)
uiuk
Z 1
 1
(s)[1  (1 gPDi(s)) 1M ][1  (1 gPDk(s)) 1M ]ds
 [1  (1  PDk) 1M ]  2 : (D-20)
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D.4 Innite periods
Now the only question remains is when M goes to innity, does the limit of
q(L
(M)
N ) exist? By (D-7),
lim
M!1
q(L
(M)
N ) = lim
M!1
(M+
p
M2 1(q)) : (D-20)
First, let us see if limM!1 M exist.
lim
M!1
M =
NX
i=1
ui lim
M!1
M [1  (1  PDi) 1M ]
(let Y =
1
M
)
=
NX
i=1
ui lim
Y!0
1  (1  PDi)Y
Y
(by L0Hopital0s rule)
=
NX
i=1
ui lim
Y!0
 (1  PDi)Y ln(1  PDi)
=
NX
i=1
ui( ln(1  PDi)) : (D-21)
Second, let us see if limM!1M2 exist.
lim
M!1
M2 =
NX
i=1
u2i lim
M!1
M [1  (1  PDi) 1M ]
+
NX
i;k=1(i6=k)
uiuk lim
M!1

M
Z 1
 1
(s)[1  (1 gPDi(s)) 1M ]
 [1  (1 gPDk(s)) 1M ]ds  [1  (1  PDk) 1M ]  lim
M!1
M2 : (D-22)
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The limit of the rst and the third part is easier, similarly to the derivation of
limM!1M,
NX
i=1
u2i lim
M!1
M [1  (1  PDi) 1M ] =
NX
i=1
u2i ( ln(1  PDi)) ; (D-23)
lim
M!1
M2 = 0 : (D-24)
For the limit of the second part, Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem
is applied. Since
(s)[1  (1 gPDi(s)) 1M ][1  (1 gPDk(s)) 1M ]  (s) ; (D-25)
then
lim
M!1
Z 1
 1
(s)[1  (1 gPDi(s)) 1M ][1  (1 gPDk(s)) 1M ]ds
=
Z 1
 1
lim
M!1
(s)[1  (1 gPDi(s)) 1M ][1  (1 gPDk(s)) 1M ]ds
=0 : (D-26)
The limit of the rest of the second part is already known,
lim
M!1
M [1  (1  PDk) 1M ] =  ln(1  PDk) : (D-27)
So the limit of the second part is  ln(1  PDk)  0 = 0.
Finally, we have
lim
M!1
M2 =
NX
i=1
u2i ( ln(1  PDi)) : (D-28)
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Substitute the results in (D-21) and (D-28),
lim
M!1
q(L
(M)
N ) =
NX
i=1
ui( ln(1 PDi))+
vuut NX
i=1
u2i ( ln(1  PDi)) 1(q) : (D-29)
In other words, the result in (D-29) can also be used as the approximation of
the VaR when M is chosen large enough.
Now the analytic VaR of a portfolio based on large enough time-step have been
solved successfully. [1]
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